How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
3.85
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
5.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
3.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
3.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
5.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
1.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
4.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
2.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
3.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
6.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
3.88
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
1.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
4.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
6.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
4.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
2.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
3.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
2.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
2.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
2.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
3.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
3.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
1.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
1.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
2.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
2.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
2.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
3.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
2.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
2.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
2.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
3.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
3.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
1.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
1.50
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
2.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
The Comoros is a country of origin and a waypoint for victims, mainly women, being trafficked from Africa into the Arabian Gulf for sex work and forced labour. It is also a destination country for forced labour and the exploitation of children.
Human smuggling into Mayotte, which has higher living standards than the Comoros islands, is common and profitable, and has a significant influence on the political economy of both Mayotte and the Comoros. Smuggling businesses are emerging and growing across the islands, especially in Anjouan, as greater numbers of people emigrate irregularly from the Comoros and neighbouring islands. The Comoros is too remote to play a major role in the human-smuggling industry, but the high number of deaths at sea as a result of the smuggling is a grave concern.
The Comoros plays a negligible role in transnational arms trafficking and there are extremely low levels of armed violence on the islands. However, the country is affected by the rampant crimes occurring in the Indian Ocean, including trafficking, piracy and illegal fishing. Cases of piracy and armed robbery are growing, and the use of light weapons, usually acquired from brokers operating in the Indian Ocean, is common among drug traffickers and pirates.
The Comoros is a large producer of vanilla, where an illicit trade runs parallel to the legal trade. There are reports of the country acting as a transit point for illicit Madagascan logs. There has been rapid clearing of land due to population growth and urban development, and while it is not tied to organized crime, it may contribute to unregulated and illicit deforestation.
Illegal fishing is a large problem in the Mozambique Channel and significantly affects the Comoros. While vessels from China and other Asian countries have been identified as the main culprits, there have been vessels sailing under the Comoros flag that have also been implicated. Most of the Comorian fleet has no connection to the country and operates in breach of national laws, mainly in the waters of West Africa. This has led to the EU issuing the Comoros a red card over its complicity in Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Moreover, tortoise trafficking is a major issue and there are also reports of shark fin moving between the Comoros and Madagascar. There are no recent reports of a non-renewable resource crimes market operating in the country.
Heroin is imported into the Comoros from Tanzania and Madagascar, primarily through maritime entry points. The Comoros is primarily a destination market for heroin, although there have been some instances of Comorian mules with heroin detained in Mauritius and France. Additionally, poor governance structures and proximity to growing heroin redistribution hubs (particularly Madagascar) could mean that the Comoros’ transit role could grow in the future. Because of the extreme poverty that the majority of the population experiences and the high price of the drug, the cocaine market is very small in the Comoros and for the most part concentrated in the capital, Moroni. Nevertheless, due to its geographical location, the country may become an attractive transit location for cocaine trafficking in the future.
The domestic use of cannabis is widespread, and the drug is both cultivated on the island and imported from Madagascar and Tanzania. Some cannabis resin imported into the Comoros is exported onwards to Mayotte. Synthetic-drug use is a growing concern in the Comoros, especially among the youth, with the country operating predominantly as a destination market with little onward transit. Synthetic drugs are cheap and widely accessible. The use of synthetic cannabinoids is growing and has been blamed for an increase in local theft and domestic and social problems.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
The Comorian state facilitates or is actively involved in most illicit markets on the islands, with corruption being particularly focused on human trafficking. Human smuggling to Mayotte is fully state-sanctioned, as the state does not recognize an international boundary. Loose criminal networks are also operational in the Comoros. As the local drug market grows, domestic criminal networks are developing and profiting, while Tanzanian networks importing heroin are well established. Criminal networks are mainly centred on human trafficking and child labour, exploiting the desires of families to move their children to Grande Comore. A significant number of people in the Comoros, especially fishermen, are employed by human-smuggling networks from Mayotte.
In Comoros, the smuggling and trafficking of people is largely facilitated by state actors, but international syndicates are primarily responsible for the transportation of people to and from the islands. Tanzanian actors are predominantly involved in drug trafficking, while vanilla smuggling is suspected to be facilitated by Madagascan nationals. They also play a significant role in importing drugs and tortoises from Madagascar, but not in domestic distribution. There is no reported existence of mafia groups or equivalents in the Comoros.
There have been minimal efforts on the part of the government to curb organized crime, and a lack of political coordination between the three main islands hampers effective governance. The Comoros remains a fragile state, and since 2009, the government and the opposition have been at odds over attempts to change the constitution, which has taken all focus from tackling organized crime. The 2018 referendum resulted in the presidential term being extended and power being concentrated, contrary to the constitution limiting presidential terms and stipulating that the presidency must rotate between each of the three main islands. The referendum was boycotted by a large portion of the electorate and there have been concerns around vote rigging. The Comoros thus has one of the highest corruption perceptions globally and is often described as an emerging dictatorship.
The Comoros is party to some international treaties pertaining to organized crime, but the country has been ‘red-carded’ by the EU and labelled as non-cooperative due to its insubstantial efforts to curb illegal fishing. Political relationships between the Comoros and France (relevant due to their proximity to Mayotte) fluctuate, but are generally difficult. There appear to be very few extradition agreements between the Comoros and other nations and international cooperation appears to be very limited. The legal system in the Comoros is hybrid in nature, using indigenous customary law, Islamic law and French civil law. The legal system is underdeveloped, and the legislative framework in place to combat organized crime is insufficient, falling below international standards.
Courts are underresourced and overburdened in the Comoros. Courts in the country also suffer an undue degree of political interference from the executive, as demonstrated by the suspension of the constitutional court in 2018 by executive order from the president. The perception amongst stakeholders on the islands is that enforcement is weak and corruption is endemic throughout the judiciary and among members of the legal profession, leading to informal justice systems being preferred to the formal systems. Similarly, corruption is endemic in law enforcement and police officers are known to collude with criminal networks across a range of markets, actively facilitating criminal activities. The rule of law is weak in the Comoros and authorities show little interest in improving standards of training or in tackling issues of corruption and criminal facilitation. As the Comoros consists of three main islands, maintaining border security is difficult and the border police is underresourced. Maritime surveillance capacity is extremely limited, as is the security infrastructure at the two main ports of the islands. Informal ports and harbours across the islands enable smaller boats to disembark and dock undetected. It is also worth noting that the government refuses to recognize the national boundary between the Comoros and Mayotte.
The financial system in the Comoros is underdeveloped and the country lacks the means to estimate proceeds of illicit activity. However, due to its underdeveloped financial system, many forms of sophisticated financial e-commerce crime are made impossible. Although money laundering is criminalized, policies are poorly implemented and systems for identifying instances of money laundering are weak. The Comoros does not have an environment suitable for businesses to thrive. Entrepreneurs are unsupported, most citizens are employed in the informal sector and regulatory capacity is extremely poor. The financial system is broadly mistrusted due to political interference and the justice system has provided more support to non-paying creditors than lending institutions.
Insufficient support is offered to victims of organized crime, and human-trafficking victims are often housed by government employees themselves due to insufficient resources. There is also no support available for drug users, and civil-society organizations have to be privately funded and lack adequate resources. There are minimal measures in place to prevent organized crime, with the government’s efforts to provide training and prevent trafficking in human beings severely lacking. Drugs are openly available in many parts of the islands, and there are limited arrests and no apparent targeting of high-level operators. Along with lack of funding and dependence on foreign donors, repressive measures have recently been taken against civil-society organizations as well as media outlets. After the controversial referendum in 2018, the media landscape has worsened considerably, with journalists experiencing a number of freedom violations, including arrests, attacks and intimidation. As a result, some journalists have been forced to flee Comoros. Strict defamation laws also impede freedom of press and contribute to the deteriorating media environment in the country.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
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This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.