How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
5.70
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
7.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
4.50
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
8.50
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
6.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
8.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
9.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
1.50
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
1.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
3.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
7.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
8.38
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
9.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
8.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
8.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
8.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
1.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
1.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
3.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
2.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
2.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
1.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
1.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
2.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
1.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
3.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
1.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
2.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
1.50
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
1.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
3.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
2.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
2.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
1.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
1.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
2.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
1.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
3.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
1.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
2.00
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
The Central African Republic (CAR) is estimated to have one of the highest levels of human trafficking globally. Labour exploitation is widespread and increasing as a result of the large number of displaced persons caused by violent conflict in the country. Both gold and diamond mines, many controlled by armed groups, have been linked to forced labour, particularly relating to minors. Cases of child soldiers have also been documented. Additionally, there have been reports of the enslavement of girls in the northern part of the country, with many trafficked to Sudan and Chad.
Violence and instability in the CAR have pushed many people to seek ways to leave the country via human smuggling. However, most of the movement within the country and across the borders takes place without the facilitation of smugglers. The main challenge for smugglers is navigating complex geographies, insecurity and competing smuggling groups, as opposed to border restrictions.
Despite a UN arms embargo that has been in force since 2013, weapons can easily be brought into the CAR. Armed conflict and border porosity contribute to the illicit demand for small arms and light weapons in the country. Additionally, the 2014 conflict led to the raiding of government armouries, increasing the levels of illicit flows of arms across the country, especially along the Democratic Republic of Congo-CAR border. Some of the weapons trafficking networks supplying armed groups in the CAR are under the control of military officers.
Timber is one of the CAR’s primary exports and logging companies have been linked to armed groups. Armed groups, local communities and some Asian actors illegally exploit timber in the CAR. With no forestry service functioning in most of the country, these actors often operate in cooperation with networks based in Sudan and South Sudan. Timber trafficking for international timber companies mostly occurs at the CAR–Cameroon border, but local communities exploit timber mainly in the southern part of the country. Some companies mix timber cut in the CAR with timber cut in Cameroon. In regard to fauna crimes, the CAR’s legal vacuum allows armed groups and poachers to engage in transnational trafficking of elephant tusks, and animals such as panthers and pangolins. Poachers from Sudan and Chad, along with armed groups that have developed relationships with foreign traffickers, enter the CAR by crossing the border with South Sudan. Additionally, independent militarized poachers take advantage of the lack of governance and enforcement. Among the main trafficked items are ivory and big-cat parts hidden in legal shipments of palm oil or cassava. Systematic bushmeat hunting is also increasing as elephant populations have decreased significantly. Forest elephants have also been targeted for poaching. In regard to non-renewable resource crimes, the illicit production and trafficking of diamonds and gold are prevalent in the CAR. Most of the gold and diamonds produced in the CAR are smuggled abroad. The market also facilitates foreign money laundering operations and has been linked to armed groups.
As the country lacks transportation infrastructures and is landlocked, the logistical environment is not conducive to heroin trafficking. However, the CAR does have existing links between domestic and regional terrorist organizations and drug trafficking, including heroin trafficking, but little is known of domestic use and supply. Similarly, there is limited evidence of a cocaine-trafficking market in the CAR because cocaine use is limited to the local elite. Meanwhile, cannabis is widely used by the local population, especially among militiamen and youth. While there is no official information on cannabis trafficking, besides some indications of the involvement of armed groups, given the country’s location and the current organized-crime landscape, it would be unrealistic to conclude that there is no illegal activity pertaining to cannabis. In regard to synthetic drugs, tramadol has become a major issue in the country. Tramadol is openly sold in several markets, mainly coming from networks based in eastern Cameroon, Chad and Sudan. Consumption was high in 2018 but the street price has since increased, making it a little less affordable.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Estimates suggest that there are approximately 20 different armed groups operating in the CAR. Among these groups, the main ones are the Union for Peace in the CAR (UPC); the Popular Front for the Renaissance in the CAR and its military wing, the National Defence and Security Committee, and the Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique. As of 2020, UPC is the most powerful armed group. Some of these groups, known as the Anti-balaka, have a very loose command structure and are ethnically based. While 14 armed groups signed a peace deal with the government in 2019, the armed groups still control most of the country. Their main source of funding is extortion and illegal taxation – in fact, powerful warlords in the country are involved in the illicit taxation of cattle traders. Some of these armed groups specialize in specific criminal markets. Meanwhile, there is also a proliferation of unorganized traffickers, bandits, criminals, robbers, road gangs (zaraguinas), smugglers, thieves and counterfeiters in the country. They focus largely on cattle theft. Since the state security services are not able to counter them, insecurity in the country is high. The CAR can be described as one of the most insecure countries in Africa.
Many state actors in the CAR operate outside the law and cooperate with criminal actors, including law enforcement officials and high-ranking members of the government. Corrupt state actors often become involved criminal enterprises, mainly wildlife crime and diamond trafficking. Moreover, since the peace deal in 2019, the government has included leaders from armed groups, which blurred the lines between state and non-state actors, as well as legal and illegal activities. As for foreign actors, they are numerous and involved in various criminal networks in the CAR, including human trafficking; arms trafficking; the illicit gold, diamond, and timber industries; and fauna crimes. Historically, foreign nationals have also controlled several high-value economic sectors such as the diamond, gold and timber industries, which are associated with criminal activities.
In the CAR, there is no real state presence outside Bangui. Moreover, a lack of citizen participation and rule of law has created a system of weak governance throughout the country. The CAR ranks among the most fragile states in the world. Furthermore, the country also has an extremely poor record of transparency and accountability. Combating organized crime is not on the government’s agenda and collusion between state and criminal actors is rife. In particular, diamond trafficking has played a key role in CAR politics, including at the highest levels of the government. Additionally, mining deals and state contracts are negotiated in secret, while public tenders are rare. International groups have also identified several suspicious bank accounts used to divert public funds from the CAR.
At international level, the CAR has ratified all but one of the international treaties pertaining to organized crime. The government also relies heavily on the international community and benefits from significant humanitarian aid. However, most international authorities do not trust CAR security services, which are seen as corrupt. As a result, the CAR government has turned to China and Russia. Currently, security cooperation with Russia is well established, while economic cooperation with China is growing. At domestic level, the policy-making capacity of the government is very limited and national policies or laws targeting organized crime are scant. Nevertheless, the CAR has stepped up efforts to combat human trafficking and the penal code criminalizes trafficking for labour and sexual exploitation. International NGOs have also offered support to develop more effective law enforcement in forest and wildlife management, but the outcomes are not yet visible.
The judicial system in the CAR has no capacity to combat organized crime. Meanwhile, a large majority of the CAR’s total prison population is in pre-trial detainment. However, a special criminal court was created in 2015 under which some militiamen were sentenced to prison in Bangui in 2019 and 2020, and more cases are pending. There is also national strategy for the demilitarization of prison, which was approved in 2019 and created with the support of several international actors. Similarly, law enforcement agencies in the CAR have no capacity to combat organized crime. Although law enforcement agencies are being rebuilt with the support of several foreign partners, corruption remains a major problem, especially in the customs service. As for territorial integrity, the CAR’s borders represent a unique case of porosity, with the total absence of any border control. The only functioning border posts are located between the CAR and Cameroon.
While the CAR has created measures to enhance economic capacity, such efforts have not been sufficient and there is no national implementation capacity. The CAR is among the poorest performers in the world on numerous measures of economic capacity. Additionally, the customs system is unreliable, and businesses often seek tax exemptions via bribes. In the CAR, there is also no capacity to implement anti-money laundering measures. A special investigation unit for money laundering was created several years ago but has no real capacity. In most cases, foreign banks have detected incidents of money laundering in the country.
There is little victim and witness support available in the CAR. However, since the conflict broke out, many international NGOs have set up trauma centres and counselling services in conflict areas, including the capital city. Many churches have hosted and protected internally displaced Muslim communities. Similarly, there is no evidence of any policies, strategies or campaigns to help prevent organized crime in the country. As for civil society organizations, they are very weak and focused more on conflict-related issues than organized crimes due to the fact that the conflict is ongoing. There are some international NGOs focused on good governance, anti-corruption and the protection of wildlife. Meanwhile, the media environment is corrupt and dangerous. International journalists were detained or killed while covering the conflict. The government has also often used bribes and intimidation to cover up reporting on corruption scandals.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
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This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.