How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
6.50
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
4.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
8.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
8.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
8.50
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
8.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
2.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
9.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
8.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
4.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
6.50
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
7.50
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
8.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
3.50
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
3.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
7.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
5.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
6.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
6.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
6.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
3.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
7.50
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.50
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
5.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
5.50
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
6.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
6.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
5.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
6.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Brazil is a source, transit and destination country for Latin American, Caribbean, African and Chinese human-trafficking victims. Brazilian nationals are victims of trafficking domestically as well as internationally, especially to Spain, Portugal and the United States. Although rarely reported, sexual and labour exploitation, illegal international adoptions and organ trafficking have been recorded. The perpetrators of these crimes are often relatives or friends of the victims, hired by agricultural, industrial or sex-work networks.
While historically a transit and source country, Brazil has also become a destination country for human smuggling. Socio-economic and political circumstances in Latin America have generated increased migration flows, with the arrival of Bolivians, Venezuelans, Peruvians and Haitians in Brazil giving rise to nationalism. The northern Brazilian states were severely affected during the Venezuelan exodus by irregular entrance routes and the forging of documents by smugglers and coyotes. Brazil is a transit country for Cubans, Haitians and others, as well as a source country for those travelling to the US. Large smuggling rings originating in Africa, the Middle East and Asia were recently dismantled.
Brazil is one of the largest producers and exporters of small weapons, many of which are smuggled back into the country from Paraguay, the US, Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia and Uruguay. Higher-calibre guns sourced from legal US markets and smuggled via Paraguay or directly to Brazil are used for organized crime, illegal police action and self-defence.
Brazil is also an exporter of illegal arms, including to Yemen; and its air and sea ports are highly vulnerable to arms trafficking. Many civilian-owned arms are unregistered and the market is plagued by a lack of transparency, inefficiency and corruption. Firearms seized by the police are rarely indexed, but are rather ‘lost’, ‘misplaced’ or stolen.
The illegal market is controlled primarily by corrupt military and police officers, as well as by transnational crime networks and gangs involved in trafficking across South America. Illegal firearms are readily available, especially to young criminals and organized groups. High homicide rates and violence between criminal actors and security forces are attributed mainly to illegal firearms.
Illegal timber extraction and biopiracy, facilitated by corruption, are significant in Brazil. In the Amazon and Atlantic forests, biopiracy involves scientists, pharmaceutical companies and the food industry. Most timber exported from the Amazon is illegally sourced, with exports destined primarily for the US, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Japan and the United Kingdom. Extraction, which is often followed by the raising of cattle, involves parallel support activities and large criminal networks, with legal companies often also getting involved in irregular practices. Furthermore, in 2020, forest fires across Brazil’s Amazon increased considerably since the previous year and a significant proportion of the fires were set deliberately, and illegally, by farmers and other agricultural workers as a means of converting rainforest into arable land. In July 2020, revelations that a government official in Brazil had deliberately abandoned the issuing of fines for illegal deforestation has been described as a ‘flashpoint’ for Brazil’s deforestation crisis.
The Amazon's criminal actors are responsible for murders and violence, particularly of/towards indigenous people, activists and the authorities. Brazil is one of the main origins of illegally traded fauna, especially birds. The market involves individuals who sell fauna to supplement their income. They supply large domestic and international criminal networks, which use corruption and bribery to forge documents and bypass inspections. Fauna including anacondas, turtles, macaws, toucans and snakes is trafficked to the US and Europe for private collectors, scientific purposes, the fashion and souvenir industries, and to be kept as pets. Although the trade endangers ecosystems and risks the spreading of diseases, it is socially accepted.
A boom in illegal mining for Amazonian gold relies on small-scale miners and larger criminal networks. The illegal market for emeralds, imperial topaz and diamonds is also substantial, with the latter being sold in France, Switzerland and Italy. Brazil is a transit country for gold and diamonds, connecting Venezuela and French Guyana. Venezuelan gold is sometimes legalized in Brazil and exported to India and the United Arab Emirates. The current gold-mining boom is facilitated by permissiveness and the COVID-19 pandemic. Illegal mining causes deforestation, erosion and water contamination, with associated violence, human trafficking and drug smuggling all reported on protected and indigenous Amazonian lands.
Although Brazil’s cocaine trade is one of largest in the world, it is primarily sourced from Andean countries and trafficked to Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Oceania. The domestic market and demand for cocaine base (coca paste) are considerable. Cocaine is the main driver of organized crime, feeding corruption, homicides, money laundering, border-monitoring difficulties and lethal violence perpetrated by criminal groups and security forces.
For decades, local elites from the border regions have competed with criminal groups to control Brazil’s wholesale cocaine routes. The profits from these operations go to these elites and criminal groups, as well as to illegal state-security markets, Colombian transnational criminal organizations and mafias. While middle-class markets are nonviolent, the urban outskirts and poor neighbourhoods have large and often-violent markets.
Brazil has the largest cannabis market in Latin America. While some actors also sell cocaine, the two drugs have separate middle- and elite-class circuits. Brazil used to produce a great portion of its cannabis, but following consumption increases, Paraguay has become the main source. São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are consumption hubs for imported cannabis, while Colombian cannabis is also traded in the north. Large criminal groups conquered the wholesale market, later also controlling cultivation, but several networks and individuals participate in retail.
While heroin consumption is sparse in Brazil, occasional seizures indicate that it is used as a transit country, with foreign actors leading transactions. The synthetic-drug market is not prevalent, and use remains limited to the upper-middle and elite classes. A limited amount of international trade occurs on the internet, and domestic networks are involved in small makeshift factories. LSD, Ecstasy and other drugs infrequently come from Europe to Brazil in exchange for cocaine. Brazil has a high incidence of legal pharmaceutical drugs being smuggled from Paraguay. In the Tri-Border Area (TBA) several types of criminal actors are responsible for the market chain.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
The most powerful criminal organization in Brazil, Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), inspired by the Comando Vermelho (CV), was formed as a self-protection group for prisoners. Both organizations exert control from inside prison through corrupt officials and are involved in drug sales, extortion and the supply of public services in marginalized areas. Their significant access to weapons has contributed to state-wide violence, prison riots and massacres. During previous elections, federal forces were called upon to police these groups. The PCC, which is also active in Paraguay, is also involved in bank and car robberies, kidnappings and money laundering.
White-collar crime groups operate as mafias in Brazil, facilitating corruption and money laundering. Militias, which often include police officers, are involved in extortion and the extrajudicial killing of political candidates. They also control gas supply, public transportation, rented property and illegal gambling. These paramilitary groups are believed to be behind recent political violence. Although predominantly urban, they are hired by businesses and landowners in rural areas to forcefully drive out residents.
State-actor participation in criminal markets is key to their success, as illustrated by the militias’ use of state resources, and their financing and appointing of political candidates, as well as their coercion of voters. White-collar crimes, including the negotiation of public contracts, also involve government officials. With regard to foreign actors, the TBA and Amazon regions are home to domestic and foreign criminal activity. Foreign networks, especially those controlling drug markets in destination countries, use domestic actors as facilitators.
Although organized crime has been a government priority, Brazil is unable to provide governance in many low-income urban areas. Strategies to tackle political and developmental failures are lacking, and the overwhelming number of legal cases has led to impunity. Current counter-organized-crime initiatives focus on punitive strategies and militarized operations. Some of President Jair Bolsonaro's policies on relaxing legislation related to the possession of weapons and incentivizing mining in indigenous lands are likely to have had a negative impact on security. Historically, Brazil suffers from corruption, with political leadership exercised through patronage systems and congressional give-and-take deals. Levels of violence throughout the country remained high, with homicides increasing in 2020 on the previous year and attacks on politicians escalating during municipal elections in November.
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous allegations of corrupt practices have been made regarding high-level state officials and public-procurement processes. The democratic process has been captured by criminal organizations, with members of the PCC and CV crime groups suspected of running as electoral candidates. Although courts are independent and clash frequently with Brazil’s executive branch, they have been accused of political bias in anti-corruption operations and their instruments of prosecution are not very effective in deterring corruption or organized crime. While access to information appears robust, there has been a notable decline in transparency generally in almost all areas, including with regard to public health, the environment and public security, among others.
Brazil has signed and ratified numerous treaties and conventions regarding arms, drug and human trafficking, and has extradition agreements with a number of countries, as well as a Southern Common Market agreement. Brazil also has cooperation agreements with international agencies and governments, as well as domestic laws and institutions related to fighting organized crime. The General Prosecutor’s Office, courts, media and human-rights organizations are generally independent and able to investigate political corruption and criminal violence.
Regulatory and procedural legislation is generally robust, although the judiciary lacks capacity and suffers from inefficiency, corruption and patronage. Brazil’s penal code outlaws criminal associations, and other laws are in place to combat transnational criminal organizations, environmental crimes, unauthorized weaponry, drug trafficking, money laundering, the adulteration of medicines and food, and human exploitation.
Regardless of the shortcomings within the judicial system, including high levels of corruption and political overreach into the judiciary, institutions including the Attorney General’s Office and the federal police seem fairly effective in investigating crime. Prisons, however, suffer from overcrowding and high pre-trial detention rates. Although a special detention regime exists for members of criminal groups, the precarious conditions in many of Brazil’s prisons have contributed to their being controlled by criminals. Additionally, the expansion of criminalization policies and militarized police strategies have not been accompanied by corresponding judicial-processing capacities. Although their budget is comparatively high, the police are underequipped when it comes to investigating organized crime. Specialized counter-organized-crime units exist within the military police, the federal police and the Rio de Janeiro police. The national force, consisting of police and firefighters, assists in volatile situations, including elections. However, militarized public-security approaches have resulted in low public trust, compounded by inefficient cooperation between Brazil’s various police forces. In June 2020, the Supreme Court announced a ban on police raids in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas amid the COVID-19 pandemic, but the ruling was often ignored by police forces and hundreds of people were killed.
Brazil’s extremely porous borders, shared with 10 countries, feature jungles, rivers and lakes, encompassing major transnational drug-trafficking routes. The TBA represents a major cluster of criminal activity, particularly for the smuggling of drugs and other illegal goods. The Attorney General’s Office and the federal police have apprehended criminals operating in this area, yet criminal activity remains extensive. The armed forces have long-standing plans to build a border-monitoring infrastructure, but the authorities also face challenges trying to maintain an effective presence elsewhere, particularly in inner-city areas.
Brazil is at moderate risk for money laundering and terrorist financing. It has a good track record in prosecuting cases involving criminal organizations and high-level corruption, and its anti-money-laundering laws have been modified in a bid to improve prosecution for the concealment of goods, but overall, the state’s capacity to investigate money laundering remains low. Although the institution dealing with suspicious financial transactions has been praised, accountability is still a concern.
Businesses are permitted to register online and the sharing of information has improved. Although the government has taken steps to simplify bureaucracy, reform the pension systems and prosecute tax avoidance, Brazil’s complex laws and regulations, high taxes and bureaucracy have resulted in slow economic growth. Overall, the state’s capacity to regulate the economy effectively is relatively low, as evidenced by the sizeable informal economy which facilitates the growth and development of organized criminal actors.
While Brazil has programmes that provide support, healthcare and psychological assistance for the victims and witnesses of crime, more could be done to assist those trying to escape from what essentially amounts to modern-day slavery. Crime victims are sometimes treated as criminals themselves, or are even killed by the police. Furthermore, while a witness protection programme exists, it is not effective in practice. Campaigns to raise awareness about fauna-related crimes, as well as drug and human trafficking, have been developed by government and non-state institutions, which work with the congress and senate to support changes in legislation. However, complex prevention mechanisms including socio-economic development policies are rare, and prisons and gated communities continue to host crime bosses. Furthermore, attorneys working in the Amazon have consistently noted the difficulties in preventing illicit activity in the region, due in part to a lack of agreements in place and cooperation between the state and the private sector.
Civil-society organizations in urban areas provide legal advice, education and health services as a response to state neglect. Elsewhere, activists and indigenous leaders who fight to protect the environment are subject to harassment and killings. The media and non-governmental organizations have criticized the state’s security forces for heavy-handed operations against organized crime; and although the media consistently denounces corruption, its coverage of organized crime is weak. Brazil is one of Latin America’s most violent countries for the media, with journalists often being the victims of threats, attacks and assassinations. Investigative journalists are often subjected to abusive judicial proceedings and attacks on their sources. Media ownership remains concentrated in the hands of large business families with close connections to the political elite.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
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give us your feedbackThe opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.