How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
5.15
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
5.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
7.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
6.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
4.50
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
4.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
3.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
6.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
4.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
5.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
5.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
6.63
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
4.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
6.50
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
8.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
8.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
3.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
5.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
3.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
3.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
3.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
4.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
5.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
4.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.50
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
3.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
4.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
3.50
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Bosnia and Herzegovina serves as a country of origin, transit point and destination (albeit to a lesser extent) for human trafficking. Victims are trafficked mainly for sexual exploitation and forced labour. Bosnia and Herzegovina is as a transit country for victims of Chinese, Indian and Turkish descent, as well as victims from Middle Eastern and the Gulf countries attempting to enter Europe. Bosnians are often victims of forced labour in the construction industry and other sectors in neighbouring Balkan and European countries. Within the country, Bosnian women and girls are trafficked for sexual exploitation in private residences and motels. In particular, marginalized Roma and other children are forced to beg, are sexually exploited and forced to do domestic work. Child trafficking is reportedly a significant issue and is on the rise. The number of foreign victims of human trafficking inside Bosnia and Herzegovina is low, but there have been recorded cases in which victims were from Afghanistan, Cuba, The Gambia, Libya and Sri Lanka.
Human smuggling is a significant issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country that plays an important role in the transit of individuals smuggled into the rest of Europe. Smuggled individuals tend to originate from the Middle East and North Africa region, most often entering Bosnia and Herzegovina from Serbia and Montenegro. Organized crime actors with connections to the political elite are known to assist smuggled individuals as they enter and leave the country, but local populations operating opportunistically also play an important role in the crime market. Thousands of smuggled individuals have found themselves stuck in the country because of the relatively strong border control in neighbouring countries, exacerbated by further restrictions in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Arms trafficking is a significant issue in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many arms from the 1990s remain in circulation and it is among the top countries globally in terms of the number of legal and illegal firearms in civilian possession. Additionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina is situated along one of the trafficking routes between large arms-supplying countries, such as Serbia and Montenegro, and destination countries for illegal firearms in Europe. This facilitates the trafficking of old weapons to organized crime groups in Austria and Germany and in Scandinavian countries. Furthermore, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a known transit country for converted weapons.
The main environmental crime markets in Bosnia and Herzegovina are those for illicit logging and illegal wildlife products. Criminal markets exist for non-renewable resources, albeit on a far smaller scale. Bosnia and Herzegovina is an exporter of both timber and timber products, mainly to the EU and neighbouring countries. Illicit exports are facilitated by gaps in legislative and customs regulatory frameworks, as well as by shortcomings in border control. Individuals connected to the political sphere and those who control public companies engage in the market.
Fauna-based illicit markets are known to exist, the most prevalent of which is the trade in endangered species. The market for quails, in particular, has become popular due to hunting tourism. However, there is no clear evidence suggesting any organized involvement of transnational organized crime actors in the illegal fauna market. Trade in commodities, such as fuel oil and natural minerals, is known to occur at the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is a small, but noteworthy, amount of illegal extraction of minerals and coal.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is an important transit country for heroin and cannabis bound for Europe. Domestic consumption of cannabis and some cultivation and production of cannabis and synthetic drugs, such as MDMA, also known as ecstasy or molly, is known to occur. It is on the route for heroin trafficked for Central Europe, making Bosnia and Herzegovina an important transit and storage country for heroin and precursor chemicals such as acidic anhydride. Chemical components for MDMA, including rare crystal powder, are imported from EU countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, and are then produced in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cannabis is transported from Albania to Bosnia and Herzegovina from where it is trafficked to Western European countries. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina has recently become a source of sour cannabis, with reports of emerging indoor cultivation and growing production in the southern and western parts of the country.
The crime market for cocaine in Bosnia and Herzegovina is less valuable and pervasive than the markets for other drugs. However, more groups are entering the market and stronger ties have been established between crime groups in Republika Srpska (with affiliations to crime organizations in Serbia and Montenegro) and Latin American drug traffickers.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
Both mafia-style groups, criminal networks, state-embedded actors and foreign criminal groups have a presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mafia-style groups are heavily involved in drugs, particularly heroin, and arms trafficking. A number of Bosnian mafia-style groups operate in various European countries and Bosnian criminals play important roles in the underworlds of these countries. Smaller criminal networks are heavily engaged in crime markets across Bosnia and Herzegovina, though the crimes are more low-level than those of the larger mafia-style actors. These networks are divided mainly along ethnic lines − between Serbs, Bosnians and Croats − though they frequently collaborate. Mafia-style actors or criminal networks from other countries in the Balkans have a sustained presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Organized crime actors originating in Kosovo, Croatia and Serbia, and to a lesser extent Montenegro and Albania, are known to hide and operate across Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, Turkish and Middle Eastern criminal actors wield significant influence over crime markets in the country. Corruption levels are high, and many criminal actors enjoy protection from individuals in the state apparatus. Some members of crime groups are employed in state institutions; others are members of dominant political parties. Political groups and criminal networks often have overlapping interests.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has a unique political architecture, with a tripartite presidency that consists of one Bosnian, one Serb and one Croat who act as the head of state on a rotating basis. Under this system, unity has been difficult to maintain and there have been many instances in which the three presidents disagree on policy. As the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly decentralized, a significant amount of power lies with the cantons. Although leaders have vowed to fight crime, they have ultimately lacked the ability to take national leadership on the issue − for example, by outlining a coherent national security strategy. With several cantonal governments, it is difficult to root out political corruption and nepotism, which enables a high degree of state capture by organized crime actors. While the country has adopted satisfactory policies against corruption and organized crime on paper, independent safeguards against corruption are weak and grand corruption and state capture remain systemic issues.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has ratified nearly all the relevant organized crime treaties. However, low levels of cooperation exist between Bosnia and Herzegovina and other countries, in large part because of the divergent foreign policy agendas of various government entities. At the same time, however, Bosnia and Herzegovina participates in both INTERPOL and Europol; its agreement on operational and strategic cooperation with Europol came into force in March 2017. The country is a signatory to the Convention on Police Cooperation in Southeast Europe, the Operational and Strategic Agreement with Europol and a number of bilateral agreements with its neighbours, including on joint patrols, cooperation mechanisms and local border traffic. Although domestic laws and policies against organized crime generally live up to global standards, implementation is severely lacking.
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s judiciary is weak and often suffers from political interference. As a result, it cannot consistently guarantee due process. While some progress has been made regarding judicial reform, the process has been riddled with delays and corruption remains a fundamental concern. Due to the administrative structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are 16 security agencies operating in the country on different administrative levels. The ability to effectively dismantle criminal organisations is seriously hampered by a lack of coordination between the many authorities in the country. Investigative capacities among law-enforcement entities are generally weak and, in some cases, police have been found to be highly corrupt and to engage in criminal activity. Additionally, Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks the infrastructure to control its borders, making it difficult to fight illicit flows moving across its borders.
Administrative complexities and high levels of corruption make Bosnia and Herzegovina a relatively difficult place to do business and a somewhat unattractive investment destination. Bosnia and Herzegovina faces a risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. Although anti-money laundering legislation is in place, its enforcement remains inadequate. Institutions generally fail to apply anti-money laundering laws and there is significant room for improvement in financial investigations. Audit and tax administration reports continue to be used in a non-systematic and reactive, rather than a proactive, manner. Financial investigations are not launched systematically in corruption cases and the overall anti-money laundering framework needs further alignment with FATF standards − the internationally endorsed global standards against money laundering and terrorist financing, which increases transparency and enables countries to take successful action against the illicit use of their financial systems.
Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks the administrative and institutional capacity to provide support for victims and witnesses of organized crime. While victim and witness support in courts has been improved in recent years, the lack of harmonisation between various legal frameworks across the country continues to engender differences in the scope of protection, as well as inequalities in access to justice for all types of proceedings. Crime prevention mechanisms remain inadequate, although dedicated corruption-prevention bodies have been set up across Bosnia and Herzegovina. Civil society organizations (CSOs) continue to play a role in the response to organized crime, particularly when it comes to victim support. While progress has been made in building institutional mechanisms for cooperation between governments and CSOs, there remains room to improve the inclusion of civil society in decision making. Bosnia and Herzegovina performs well in terms of press freedom compared with other countries in the Western Balkans, but the country’s independent journalists often find themselves subject to intimidation and defamation suits.
Access the GI-TOC website for more content related to the Global Organized Crime Index
For a better experience, please rotate your device.
The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
We're constantly working to improve the Index. By participating in this survey, you will be providing us with insights and suggestions that will help us make the Index an even better resource.
give us your feedback
This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.