How to measure organized crime?
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.netCriminal markets
2.55
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
2.50
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
3.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Arms trafficking
3.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Flora crimes
1.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
1.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
3.50
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
2.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
3.50
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
4.50
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
1.50
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Criminal actors
3.38
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Mafia-style groups
1.00
Clearly defined organized crime groups that usually have a known name, defined leadership, territorial control and identifiable membership.
Criminal networks
4.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
1.50
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
7.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Political leadership and governance
7.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
7.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
8.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
8.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
6.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
8.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
8.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
8.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
8.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Political leadership and governance
7.00
The State's role in responding to organized crime and its effectiveness. Strong political leadership/governance suggests higher resilience.
Government transparency and accountability
7.00
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
8.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
8.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
8.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
8.00
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
8.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
6.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
8.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
8.50
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
8.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
8.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Concern has been raised over instances of forced labour in seasonal and domestic work industries; however, no data is available to confirm the existence of a human trafficking market in Andorra.
Andorra has low rates of human smuggling, as opposed to neighbouring Spain and France, where the market is significantly larger. Nevertheless, foreign actors have been prosecuted for their involvement in human smuggling, having sold Andorran resident permits to Chinese nationals then smuggled them through Andorra into France.
Arms trafficking occurs in Andorra but on a very small scale. Most cases typically involve weapons being smuggled from Andorra into France, as it is easier to acquire them in Andorra. There is no evidence of local violence caused by actors engaged in arms trafficking.
There is no developed criminal market for flora in Andorra – and no evidence of flora being brought illegally into or out of the country. Similarly, no significant criminal market for fauna exists in Andorra. While non-renewable resource crimes are not overly present in Andorra, the trafficking and laundering of precious metals and minerals does occur, albeit on a small scale. Jewellery is one of Andorra’s most significant commercial sectors, and several cases have been recorded of Andorran citizens being involved in the illicit trafficking of gold and diamonds. Additionally, illegally mined gold in France has allegedly been smuggled into Andorra and sold. The country was once considered a tax haven, which has probably increased the likelihood of the existence of money laundering schemes related to the trade in natural resources. Overall, evidence suggests that the criminal market for non-renewable resources in Andorra is limited. However, as gold and diamonds act as facilitating products for money laundering, there may be a larger market than realized.
Illicit drug trafficking does not pose a substantive threat to Andorra as the local consumption of narcotics is low and drug traffickers in the region prefer more accessible routes through the ports of Perpignan and Biarritz in France and through ports in Spain. However, there are recorded cases of heroin being trafficked into Andorra, mainly involving loose criminal networks. Based on seizure statistics, it is likely that there is a larger market for cocaine than heroin. Most seizures, however, are from Spanish and French tourists, as well as from other non-residents who intend using the drug for personal consumption. Nevertheless, large quantities of cocaine destined for local markets have also been seized.
The local production of cannabis has increased in recent years, as have cannabis imports from neighbouring countries. Cannabis appears to be smuggled mostly from Spain and to a lesser extent from France, predominantly by criminal networks consisting mainly of Andorran residents. Trafficking routes reportedly go through official checkpoints and the mountainous terrain between borders. The synthetic drug market appears to be small, with sources close to the police reporting a decrease in synthetic drug use. Synthetic drugs are nevertheless trafficked into Andorra, coming primarily from Northern Europe in cocaine and cannabis shipments.
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
*This indicator was first included in the 2023 iteration of the tool
The most prominent criminal groups in Andorra appear to be made up of foreign criminal actors. Many foreign criminal actors are involved in money laundering in the country. In addition, criminal organizations from Russian-speaking countries and the Balkans are involved primarily in serial burglaries and damage to property. Groups of jewellery thieves from Serbia (the Pink Panthers) and China (the Pink Pandas) operate in Andorra as well. There have also been registered cases of human smuggling perpetrated by Chinese criminal organizations. The criminal networks operating in Andorra are market-specific and involved predominantly in the drug trade. Information suggests that there is cooperation between local criminal actors and foreign criminal networks (for example, networks operating in France).
State-embedded actors are not generally involved in transnational criminal activity, although there may be occasional cooperation between organized crime groups and officials in certain transactions. There is no information that any mafia-style groups operate in Andorra.
Although there is not much evidence of organized crime in Andorra, the country puts emphasis on developing and implementing prevention strategies. It has also committed to fighting drug trafficking and the selling of cannabis-related substances to underage youth. Andorra’s government has a system of checks and balances in place to prevent corruption. However, in 2015 the international community raised organized crime in Andorra as an issue when the Banca Privada d’Andorra (BPA) was implicated in money laundering on behalf of organized-crime groups. Transparency in the country is observed, with the government publishing its budget as well as information on the clearance of its accounts. In 2019 it put forward a law to promote transparency in public administration, but while the bill proposes that officials declare their assets upon taking and leaving public office, the provisions do not bind them to adhere to this measure.
Andorra generally complies with international standards in regard to fighting organized crime, and collaborates successfully with international institutions and mechanisms. Andorra has effective bilateral agreements, including cooperation protocols, with the Spanish police, and more effective cooperation protocols with France are in development. In regard to extradition, Andorra adheres to the European Convention on Extradition, drawn up in 1957 by the Council of Europe. Due to its history of money laundering and tax evasion, Andorra approved a law in 2017 which reinforced their criminalization. Because it has a low criminality rate, the country’s legal framework for organized crime appears sufficient.
In the wake of the BPA scandal, the Andorran judiciary established a new unit to tackle organized crime. Even though effort has been put into equipping the judiciary to deal with issues of organized crime, the enforcement and implementation of preventive and suppressive measures is still lacking. According to reports, Andorra’s only prison meets international standards, provides adequate health services and satisfies all the basic needs of its prisoners. Andorra has a Criminal Police International Cooperation Department within its Police Corps, which encompasses INTERPOL’s National Central Bureau in the country. This unit focuses specifically on issues related to organized crime and shares intelligence with its partner countries. Additionally, Division III: Judicial Police and Criminal Investigation, a unit within the Directorate of the Police, has specialized sections on drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime. While law enforcement measures have improved, the implementation of anti-crime measures is poor, especially insofar as money laundering offences are concerned. There are close relationships between the Andorran and Spanish authorities; however, Andorra’s relationship with the French police and customs agents is less developed, a situation that has resulted in more illicit cross-border activities, such as arms and cigarette trafficking. Nevertheless, the geographic and topographic features of the country along with the lack of an international airport and port deem it less vulnerable than other countries in the region.
Andorra used to be considered a tax haven and has a history of large-scale money laundering operations permeating the legal economy. Following the BPA scandal, however, the regulatory and institutional framework was reformed to meet international standards. The country has a financial intelligence unit, which is dedicated to implementing legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorism financing and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Due to external pressures in the wake of the 2015 scandal, Andorra eased its bank-secrecy laws and now complies with international standards on economic regulation. The economic environment allows for the expansion of legitimate businesses, and regulations have been introduced with the intention of creating a modern, transparent and internationally comparable regulatory framework that will attract both foreign investors and legitimate businesses.
There is a specialized service for victims of human trafficking in Andorra, even though no cases of trafficking have been reported. No information is available regarding witness protection programmes, but Andorra’s low organized crime rate suggests that these may not be a priority. There is an emphasis on prevention strategies aimed at tackling organized crime, the most substantial one being related to drug use prevention. There are also departments within the police force and the country’s mental health centre that focus respectively on prevention and social orientation, as well as on addiction treatments. Prevention strategies have also been implemented in relation to robbery, child abuse and cybercrime.
Andorran journalists and media houses are free to report on news related to organized crime without fear of prosecution or retaliation. Media outlets are reportedly dependent on political, business and religious interests, which heavily influence coverage. Conflicts of interest between these stakeholders, along with the level of difficulty associated with reporting on the activities of banks in the country, are among the biggest problems that journalists face.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
A series of 13 discussion papers, one for each illicit market considered during the development of the Index.
Read more on globalinitiative.net
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This report was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State.
ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.