





HAITI



6.53 $\nearrow 0.60$
CRIMINALITY SCORE

35th of 193 countries $\nearrow 15$
11th of 35 American countries $\nearrow 1$
1st of 13 Caribbean countries -



CRIMINAL MARKETS 6.27 $\nearrow 0.50$

HUMAN TRAFFICKING	8.00 $\nearrow 0.50$
HUMAN SMUGGLING	7.50 $\nearrow 0.50$
EXTORTION & PROTECTION RACKETEERING	8.00 $\nearrow 1.00$
ARMS TRAFFICKING	8.50 $\nearrow 1.50$
TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS	6.00 $\nearrow 1.00$
ILLCIT TRADE IN EXCISABLE GOODS	6.00 $\nearrow 1.00$
FLORA CRIMES	7.00 $\nearrow 0.50$
FAUNA CRIMES	5.00 $\nearrow 0.50$
NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	6.50 0.00
HEROIN TRADE	2.00 0.00
COCAINE TRADE	8.50 $\nearrow 0.50$
CANNABIS TRADE	6.50 0.00
SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	3.50 0.00
CYBER-DEPENDENT CRIMES	3.00 0.00
FINANCIAL CRIMES	8.00 $\nearrow 0.50$



CRIMINAL ACTORS 6.80 $\nearrow 0.70$

MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	9.00 $\nearrow 0.50$
CRIMINAL NETWORKS	7.00 $\nearrow 0.50$
STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	8.50 $\nearrow 0.50$
FOREIGN ACTORS	4.50 0.00
PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS	5.00 $\nearrow 2.00$



This project was funded in part
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


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HAITI




2.21 $\searrow 0.25$

RESILIENCE SCORE

177th of 193 countries $\searrow 3$

33rd of 35 American countries -

13th of 13 Caribbean countries -



POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE **2.00** 0.00

GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY **1.50** 0.00

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION **3.50** $\nearrow 0.50$

NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS **4.00** 0.00

JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION **2.00** $\searrow 0.50$

LAW ENFORCEMENT **1.50** $\searrow 0.50$

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY **1.50** $\searrow 0.50$

ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING **2.00** $\searrow 0.50$

ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY **1.50** $\searrow 0.50$

VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT **1.50** 0.00

PREVENTION **2.00** $\searrow 0.50$

NON-STATE ACTORS **3.50** $\searrow 0.50$



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CRIMINALITY

CRIMINAL MARKETS

PEOPLE

Human trafficking in Haiti remains severe, with widespread child servitude under the 'restavek' system (whereby children living in poverty are given away to affluent families) and a growing number of trafficking cases involving Haitian migrants – particularly children – who are exploited across the Caribbean and the Americas. Recent reports have indicated gangs' involvement in organ trafficking, with these groups allegedly operating clinics to harvest organs from abductees. Foreign nationals, especially women, face growing risks of sex trafficking, and some orphanages have been implicated in abuse. Corruption among judicial, police and immigration officials is pervasive, with numerous reports of traffickers bribing officials to avoid prosecution or facilitate unauthorized crossings, particularly across the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

Human smuggling efforts have grown due to prolonged economic hardship, natural disasters and political instability, making Haiti a key source country in the region. Smugglers exploit weak border controls and corruption across land, sea and air routes, increasing relying on maritime departures as land migration declines. Young women and children are especially vulnerable to labour and sexual exploitation during transit. Migrants often travel as far as their limited resources will allow, with some routes through South America leading to onward journeys via the Darién Gap. Despite efforts to enhance enforcement, a lack of legal pathways, restrictive migration requirements abroad and systemic barriers to documentation have fuelled irregular migration.

Extortion and racketeering in Haiti have surged, driven by the growing power of gangs, widespread access to weapons and a collapse of state authority following political upheaval. Criminal groups now control critical infrastructure – including ports, fuel depots and trade routes – and routinely extract payments from businesses, farmers and transporters. In Port-au-Prince and beyond, refusal to pay extortion fees often results in violence, contributing to mass business closures and displacement. Gangs finance their operations through ransom kidnappings and 'taxes' on commerce, with some payments made in weapons. Attempts to curb gang activity have faltered as interventions have ended, allowing gang-controlled checkpoints and tolls to proliferate – particularly along key transit corridors leading to Haiti's southern departments.

TRADE

Arms trafficking has expanded significantly, with weapons increasingly smuggled from the US despite embargoes. The trade is driven by political and economic elites collaborating with criminal networks to arm gangs, who increasingly use powerful firearms to control territory, carry out kidnappings and confront law enforcement. Rising demand has driven up the prices of high-powered weapons, which are often concealed in cargo shipments. Recent cases have included the construction of new smuggling infrastructure in coastal areas. Weak border enforcement, the diversion of official stockpiles and the emergence of untraceable weapons have exacerbated violence, particularly in areas already plagued by frequent gang attacks.

The trade in counterfeited goods is a prevalent criminal market and encompasses a wide range of products, including alcohol, pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. The increasing infiltration of counterfeit medicines into both formal and informal supply chains poses ongoing public health risks. Incidents of severe illness and death linked to methanol-laced alcohol and toxic counterfeit medications underscore the health impact of this trade. Haiti also functions as a minor source of counterfeit clothing globally.

Similarly, the illicit trade in excisable goods remains a major revenue stream for criminal networks, enabled by porous borders, corruption and weak governance. Commonly smuggled items include alcohol and cigarettes, which often enter the country through unofficial crossings from the Dominican Republic. This trade undermines domestic markets, reduces state revenue and exacerbates regional tensions. Recent seizures, including of large volumes of cigarettes and alcohol, highlight the scale of cross-border trafficking.

ENVIRONMENT

The illicit trade in timber and charcoal continues to drive widespread deforestation in Haiti, where wood fuel remains the primary energy source amid infrastructure gaps and economic hardship. Logging and charcoal production, largely by smallholder farmers, provide critical income but lead to soil erosion, biodiversity loss and forest depletion – particularly of mangroves and endemic habitats. Furthermore, the widespread influence of organized crime in Haiti strongly suggests connections to the illegal exploitation of natural resources, including the charcoal and timber trade. Smuggling to the Dominican Republic and little external demand for hardwoods exacerbate the problem. Haiti remains highly vulnerable to illegal logging and forest governance failure.

Similarly, wildlife trafficking and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing remain persistent issues, fuelled by instability, limited enforcement and weak environmental

governance. Despite declining domestic demand, Haiti is a major wildlife exporter to the US, with criminal groups reportedly using drug smuggling routes to traffic fauna. The recent seizure of a fishing vessel in Fort-Liberté Bay, suspected of smuggling eels to Asian markets, highlights ongoing challenges with this trade. Meanwhile, IUU fishing – driven by foreign vessels and minimal regulation – threatens marine biodiversity and coral ecosystems.

Fuel smuggling is notable in Haiti, with activity from the Dominican Republic increasing since the cessation of subsidized imports of Venezuelan oil – thereby fuelling a profitable black market. Haitian authorities have struggled to maintain supply, while gangs have exploited the situation by hijacking fuel shipments, controlling critical infrastructure and demanding ransoms. Price disparities between official and black-market fuel prices have widened, disproportionately affecting regions outside Port-au-Prince and deepening insecurity and poverty.

DRUGS

Haiti remains a transit hub for international drug trafficking, with operations primarily controlled by foreign criminal groups in collaboration with domestic gangs. These local groups offer protection and storage for narcotics, often with the complicity of state-affiliated individuals. Drugs enter Haiti via the Dominican border and coastal routes before being redistributed to destinations including Puerto Rico, the US, Europe and Canada.

Due to its subsistence economy, Haiti is not a country with significant drug consumption or production. Evidence suggests that there is not a major market for heroin, which usually arrives alongside larger cocaine shipments and transits Haiti on its way to destination markets.

Cocaine trafficking in Haiti involves transnational cartels and domestic gangs, with routes primarily originating in Colombia and transiting through various Caribbean countries. Despite low domestic consumption, Haiti remains a transit point, with cocaine entering via maritime routes, airdrops and clandestine landing strips. Local gangs, including the 5 Segond group, facilitate drug distribution, controlling key transport routes and imposing tolls on traffickers. Corruption within law enforcement and the government, coupled with weak security, exacerbate the issue. The deep ties between political elites and drug trafficking, highlighted by sanctions against former officials, underscore the persistence of this illicit trade.

Haiti serves as both a source and transit country for cannabis, with fields located primarily in the south, south-east, and the Artibonite and Grand'Anse regions. Domestically, cannabis has a 6% prevalence rate, while the country is a transit route for marijuana trafficked from Jamaica to the US or The Bahamas. Local armed gangs, often in collaboration with transnational organized criminals, facilitate cannabis

trafficking. The drug is exchanged for firearms and seizures are frequent. Major trafficking entry points include Hinche, Jacmel, Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haitien.

While there is limited data on consumption and shipments, Haiti is likely a transit point for synthetic drugs. These drugs often accompany cocaine shipments, suggesting that local gangs protect and store them during transit to destinations such as the US, Canada, The Bahamas, Jamaica and Europe. Despite the involvement of well-established trafficking networks, which include local gangs and corrupt officials, synthetic drug use within Haiti is minimal.

CYBER-DEPENDENT CRIMES

While reported cases suggest that cyber-dependent crimes occur sporadically in Haiti, businesses, essential service providers, government institutions and people remain frequent targets of cyber-attacks – particularly by hacking groups. As Haitian banks continue to adopt e-banking services, the risk of such crimes is expected to rise. However, the absence of consistent reporting makes it difficult to assess the true scale of the threat.

FINANCIAL CRIMES

Corruption is the primary driver of financial crime in Haiti, where the financial crime landscape remains dire. Financial crimes involve misuse of funds, tax evasion and embezzlement, with high-level state-affiliated actors frequently implicated. Additionally, instances of cyber-enabled financial fraud have increased, with notable arrests related to fraud against large companies. These developments highlight systemic corruption and inefficiency.

CRIMINAL ACTORS

Gang violence in Haiti is escalating, with at least 200 gangs controlling vast portions of urban and rural areas, including the capital, Port-au-Prince, and several other cities. Two powerful groups are the Gran Grif gang and the Viv Ansanm gang coalition, which formed in 2023 to consolidate power, reduce internal conflicts and increase control over key territories across Haiti. Often linked to political actors, these groups engage in drug and arms trafficking, extortion and kidnapping. Gang influence extends to control of economic assets, such as ports and roads, and they use violence to enforce dominance, with children particularly vulnerable. The government's inability to maintain control has allowed gangs to assume roles in providing essential services while also manipulating political outcomes. Transnational influences, including arms trafficking from the US, have exacerbated the violence and further destabilized the country.

Smaller criminal networks, often armed with easily accessible firearms, engage in theft, assault and targeted

robberies – particularly against victims leaving banks. While less organized than larger gangs, these groups hold significant sway over neighbourhoods, fuelling corruption and undermining urban security. After a brief lull, violence has surged as gangs and smaller networks adapt to the changing political circumstances.

State actors heavily influence Haiti's organized crime landscape. Political figures have historically used armed gangs for control, shifting violence from political unrest to widespread criminal activity. Gangs receive support from state actors, often engaging in transnational crimes such as arms trafficking and money laundering. Corruption permeates all levels of government, with notable links between elites and criminal networks – as seen in high-profile cases of bribery and illicit enrichment. In 2024, multiple revelations reinforced these ties after allegations of bribery and extortion surfaced within the transitional government. A former senior political figure was sanctioned internationally for suspected links to drug trafficking, while investigations revealed misappropriation of public resources – including fuel diversion, misuse of school food programs and unexplained enrichment – implicating several former ministers and government officials. These dynamics severely undermine governance, law enforcement and Haiti's democratic process.

Foreign criminal actors have historically operated in Haiti, focusing on cocaine trafficking and human smuggling, and have often been linked to neighbouring countries like the Dominican Republic and Jamaica. They typically concentrate on urban centres and regions with vulnerable borders and ports, offering opportunities for exploitation. However, their influence over the criminal markets in Haiti is limited due to the dominance of local actors as well as the country's political instability and poor socio-economic conditions.

Lastly, Haiti's political instability, widespread poverty and overall lack of regulation enable private sector actors to exploit criminal economic opportunities with minimal oversight. While there is limited data on their direct involvement in criminal activities, their engagement is nonetheless noted. Key sectors such as real estate, construction and informal financial networks are used for money laundering, while private security firms may facilitate arms trafficking and involvement in the drug trade. Private actors also profit from human trafficking, particularly through orphanages, where children are exploited. Despite these issues, no private individuals have been formally charged for criminal involvement, though foreign governments have imposed sanctions on some.

RESILIENCE

LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

Haiti's political instability deepened after the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, leading to a power struggle and ongoing governance paralysis. Organized crime has further influenced the country's fragile political landscape, with gangs assuming quasi-state roles in many neighbourhoods and exacerbating instability. Gangs control critical areas, trade routes and resources, intensifying violence and contributing to a humanitarian crisis. The international community, including a multilateral force, has attempted to intervene, but funding and coordination challenges hinder progress. Worsening insecurity, further political deadlock, and a weakened state leave Haiti unable to address its mounting crises.

Corruption remains pervasive within the government and transitional bodies, hampering efforts to restore order. Despite the existence of institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Unit and the Central Financial Intelligence Unit (UCREF), political interference and limited resources undermine their effectiveness. Laws aimed at tackling corruption, such as that which reduced UCREF's powers in 2017, have been compromised. The establishment of a Transitional Presidential Council has been tasked with

preparing Haiti for elections, but it has faced internal corruption, with members indicted for bribery. International collaborations, including with the Organization of American States, seek to strengthen anti-corruption efforts, but transparency and accountability remain significant challenges.

Haiti's political crisis has prompted increased international involvement aimed at combating organized crime, arms trafficking and corruption. Although the country has ratified major international treaties, its lack of extradition treaties and weak governance hamper enforcement. Notable cooperation includes a US partnership to create a Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit and a UN-authorized Multinational Security Support mission authorized to assist the Haitian National Police (HNP). Haiti also participates in regional law enforcement cooperation through Ameripol and cybercrime initiatives. However, systemic corruption, institutional weaknesses and tensions between international actors and local authorities hinder the effectiveness of these efforts.

Domestically, Haiti has enacted legislation targeting organized crime, such as anti-money laundering, drug trafficking and firearms regulations. However, enforcement remains weak

due to deficiencies in executive and judicial operations, as well as issues in land tenure and customs law. Furthermore, the country lacks comprehensive cybercrime legislation, leaving it vulnerable to digital threats. A long-delayed reform of Haiti's penal code, which addresses gender-based violence and sexual orientation discrimination, was scheduled for 2024, but has been further postponed due to ongoing political and institutional challenges.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY

Haiti's judiciary is heavily influenced by the executive branch, with corruption and inefficiency hampering its function. Judges face low salaries, minimal training and inadequate resources, making them vulnerable to bribery. The system is further weakened by poor coordination, case delays and arbitrary arrests. Prisons are overcrowded, with detainees facing prolonged pretrial detention, and poor conditions contribute to high mortality rates. Criminal groups have seized court buildings, destroyed records and further destabilized the judicial process. Recent efforts to address these issues include appointing investigative judges, but political interference and limited resources persist.

Meanwhile, the HNP, the primary agency responsible for combating organized crime, is under-resourced, fragmented and plagued by corruption, with some officers participating in or accepting bribes from criminal groups. The force struggles with inadequate funding, training, equipment and high levels of violence, including frequent attacks on officers. Despite external support, including from a Kenya-led police deployment, the HNP's operations remain weak, exacerbated by a lack of consistent leadership and the rise of vigilante groups like Bwa Kalé.

Haiti's porous borders and weak enforcement mechanisms allow transnational criminal networks engaging in drug and weapons smuggling, human trafficking and document fraud to thrive. The Haitian Coast Guard's minimal capacity and the rugged terrain along the country's border with the Dominican Republic further exacerbate the issue, with criminal groups exploiting these vulnerabilities. Gangs control over 90% of Port-au-Prince and 60% of Haiti's overall territory, including critical trade routes and infrastructure. These groups, including 400 Mawozo, collaborate with Dominican traffickers and further undermine national security.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Haiti faces significant challenges in combating money laundering due to political instability, a weak judiciary and limited enforcement capacity. Despite strengthening anti-money laundering laws in 2017, the UCREF struggles with executive interference, leading to few prosecutions or convictions. Haiti was placed on the Financial Action Task Force's Grey List in 2021 and remained on it in 2024. The country has implemented Know Your Customer procedures and established regulatory bodies to improve transparency,

but successful investigations are rare. High-profile figures have faced allegations of money laundering.

Haiti's economy is severely constrained by political instability, economic repression and governance challenges. Inflation remains high, with poverty affecting 60% of the population. Fuel shortages, security deterioration and reduced social programmes have further worsened the economic crisis. Although Haiti has attempted to implement a macroeconomic framework to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund, its efforts have been hampered by weak enforcement mechanisms and pervasive corruption. Organized crime syndicates dominate sectors including private security and informal markets, further eroding legitimate business opportunities. Additionally, international sanctions, including an arms embargo, continue to undermine the country's economic and security stability.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

Haiti's victim and witness protection systems remain inadequate despite legal frameworks like the 2014 Anti-Trafficking Law. Challenges include poor judicial implementation, high legal costs and the use of French in legal proceedings, a language that most Haitians do not speak. Gender discrimination and economic inequality leave many victims, especially women, without access to justice. Corruption and insufficient funding further hinder victim protection, particularly in cases of sexual and gender-based violence, where stigma and fear of retaliation deter reporting. NGOs provide vital support, as state efforts are limited by broader socio-political instability.

Haiti's crime prevention strategies have faced significant limitations in recent years. Intelligence services and law enforcement struggle with low funding and a lack of public trust, while criminal gangs maintain strong ties with authorities. Although some community policing and socio-economic initiatives have been implemented, progress remains limited. While regional and international cooperation has led to some actions, including the UN-backed multinational mission, insecurity persists.

Non-state actors, including civil society organizations and grassroots initiatives, play a pivotal role in combating organized crime and providing essential services like legal aid and community outreach. Several of these organizations work on peace efforts, including the reintegration of child soldiers, and human rights advocacy. However, they often face violence and attacks on their offices. The media sector, while constitutionally protected, struggles with harassment and impunity. Journalists regularly face violence, kidnappings and killings, reflecting the broader insecurity and lack of justice.

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