



4.88 **CRIMINALITY SCORE**

104th of 193 countries **31**st of 54 African countries **3**rd of 6 North African countries



CRIMINAL MARKETS	5.17
HUMAN TRAFFICKING	4.00
HUMAN SMUGGLING	7.00
EXTORTION & PROTECTION RACKETEERING	3.00
ARMS TRAFFICKING	4.50
TRADE IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS	6.00
ILLICIT TRADE IN EXCISABLE GOODS	6.50
FLORA CRIMES	2.00
FAUNA CRIMES	5.50
NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	7.00
HEROIN TRADE	2.50
COCAINE TRADE	4.00
CANNABIS TRADE	7.00
SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	6.50
CYBER-DEPENDENT CRIMES	4.00
FINANCIAL CRIMES	8.00
CRIMINAL ACTORS	4.60



CRIMINAL ACTORS	4.60
MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	1.50
CRIMINAL NETWORKS	5.00
STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	7.50
FOREIGN ACTORS	5.00
PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS	4.00



4.38 **RESILIENCE SCORE**


























CRIMINALITY

CRIMINAL MARKETS

PEOPLE

Human trafficking is prevalent in Algeria, with West African criminal networks driving the crime market. These networks exploit children and women from the region for begging and sexual exploitation in the country. The trafficking market emerged in southern Algeria but has now spread to northern cities, with more than half of the victims coming from the region of Zinder in Niger. Moreover, irregular migrants travelling through Algeria are also vulnerable to human trafficking and extortion by smugglers. Reports indicate that instances of exploitative and bonded labour are common, particularly for smuggled individuals from sub-Saharan Africa.

Algeria is a transit and destination country for human smuggling, which is a growing problem. A higher volume of migrants has been received by the country in recent years, some of whom have reached Algeria using smuggling routes. On the other hand, Spain has registered an increase in irregular entries of Algerians, who are the largest nationality recorded. Human smuggling networks operate along Algeria's southern borders, which serve as a vital transit site for people traveling to Morocco and Libya. Though Algerian authorities have dismantled several smuggling networks, their efforts have largely failed to reduce the size and reach of the market. Smuggling networks are now increasingly involved in lodging and subsidiary services, in addition to transportation. Extortion and protection racketeering is also prevalent in the country with smuggled individuals being vulnerable to such illicit activities carried out by smugglers who intercept them in border areas with Niger, Algeria, Chad, and Sudan and demand money in exchange for transportation.

TRADE

Arms trafficking in Algeria is primarily linked to the southern region of the country. It is unclear whether the larger dynamics of arms trafficking within the country are still active, but the recent disruption caused by the war in Ukraine has raised concerns within the military and security services about Algeria's ability to maintain its weapons stockpile and acquire new arms. Most of the weapons imported into Algeria come from Russia. The criminal economy of arms trafficking is dominated by a small number of regional players who have transnational connections through family and tribal fraternities, and local intermediaries in Algeria.

The counterfeit market is significant, with some areas known as 'Taiwan' specializing in the production of fake

goods. Although the legal framework for intellectual property (IP) rights in Algeria has improved, enforcement of laws remains inadequate, particularly in cosmetics, clothing, shoes, toys, electrical appliances, pharmaceutical products and some consumer and food products. However, the Algerian authorities have boosted efforts to improve IP protection and enforcement, including disbanding informal trade markets that sell counterfeit merchandise and increasing coordination between customs authorities and law enforcement.

Algeria is also a significant origin, transit, and destination country for the illicit trade of cigarettes. Illicit cigarettes from Mali, Guinea, Benin, and Togo are smuggled into convoys heading towards Libya, Algeria, and Sudan, with Algeria being the leading outflow country in the Maghreb area towards Europe. The COVID-19 pandemic heavily affected the trade of excise goods due to maritime closures. However, the market continues to be pervasive in Algeria.

ENVIRONMENT

The illegal trafficking of flora in Algeria has been consistent over the past two years. Locals continue to illegally log cedar and fir trees in the Atlas Mountains, destroying many old-growth forests and endangering species such as the Tassili cypress, Numidian fir, and black pine. The pandemic has worsened the problem, leading to higher rates of illegal logging and endangering the Algerian oak species.

Several fauna species in Algeria are in danger of extinction as well as a result of poaching and illegal wildlife trade. The illegal hunting of the endangered gazelle and bearded mouflon is particularly concerning and is often underreported. Smuggling of birds, including the coveted goldfinch, is a growing trend in Algeria, where the bird has all but disappeared due to hunting. Other endangered species traded in the country or transiting through it, include the Genette, Saharan Barbary sheep, Atlas leopard, hyenas, jackals, fennec, cheetahs, spurthighed tortoises, grey parrots, and chameleons. Actors from various Gulf countries play an important role in the fauna crimes market in Algeria, participating in poaching and the purchase of animal trophies.

Fuel smuggling is significant issue, resulting in close to a billion dollars in losses a year. Most of the fuel is diverted to neighbouring countries on account of large price differentials, and smuggling networks are primarily based in borderlands or nearby cities. While the government has stepped up efforts to combat illegal small-scale gold mining, gold trafficking has become prevalent in the far south of Algeria in recent years. Foreign groups dominate illicit gold mining in the region, with few locals involved. This market causes serious environmental damage as a result



of the use of chemical agents such as mercury and lead. In a recent development, airline employees have become involved in smuggling gold bars abroad.

DRUGS

Algeria's heroin market is small owing to the lack of cultural appeal for its consumption and being situated away from heroin trafficking routes. Although heroin seizures have increased indicating an uptick in trafficking, little production has been found in Algeria. Poppy plantations have been uncovered in the southwest, but opioids have a small, localized market.

Algeria is emerging as a new and significant hub for cocaine trafficking, linking Latin American cartels with drug markets in Europe. Large quantities of cocaine transit Algerian waters and port facilities, with corrupt security officials, local business, political elites, and overseas criminal organizations facilitating the trade through the country. Recent cocaine seizures and its availability in popular areas in Algiers suggest the emergence of a still small local consumption market as well. The cocaine trade is shifting from the West African drug route to the northwest African route, stretching from southern and northern Morocco to eastern Algeria.

Cannabis trafficking is the most prevalent criminal market in Algeria, with long-standing regional connections to Moroccan counterparts. While cannabis cultivation is low and destined for domestic consumption, cannabis resin is produced and used in large quantities, with Algeria becoming a source country for this product to France and Europe. However, most of the cannabis circulating in the country comes from Morocco, with Algeria being a major destination and transit market. Hashish smuggling is increasingly moving at the edge of Algeria's southern borders. There has also been a rise in the use of kif in Algeria, even though the authorities have cracked down on several networks.

The synthetic drug market has been growing at a fast pace in the past two years, with seizures increasing. Tramadol and codeine smuggling dominate the market, and pregabalin smuggling is a growing business. Synthetic drugs are easily accessible because of their cheap price, but violence is rarely associated with the market. Container shipments in major northern ports in Algiers, Oran, and Annaba are one way the commodity penetrates Algeria, with a surprisingly large quantity also smuggled in overland, either from Tunisia or Sahelian countries. The consumption of synthetic drugs is becoming more common than cannabis among young people.

CYBER-DEPENDENT CRIMES

Algeria is considered to be at high risk of cybercrimes, with many cases of mobile devices being infected with malware. The police have reported close to a quarter increase in cybercrime cases from 2019 to 2021. Algeria is particularly vulnerable to spyware attacks and has been targeted by foreign malware. The lack of specific legislation focused on cybersecurity and a general lack of awareness among the population, and authorities contribute to this situation.

FINANCIAL CRIMES

Embezzlement, misuse of funds, and other financial crimes are prevalent in Algeria, with many cases involving corruption among powerful individuals and businesspeople, rather than organized crime groups. These crimes often involve interconnected networks of patrons and clients. The country's large informal, cash-based economy, estimated at almost half of the GDP, is vulnerable to abuse by criminals. Additionally, tax evasion and fiscal fraud in the informal sector cost the country hundreds of billions a year.

CRIMINAL ACTORS

There is currently no evidence of mafia-style criminal groups operating in Algeria. However, criminal networks remain highly active and economically dominant in the country, with transnational linkages and involvement in illegal activities such as human and drug trafficking, smuggling of basic and excise products, and arms trafficking. These networks are concentrated in metropolises of Algeria and are associated with varying levels of violence, from low to medium-high. Although there are no state-embedded criminal organizations tied to the Algerian government, corruption remains pervasive, with the presence of highlevel criminal actors. Insufficient checks and balances contribute to corruption. It is difficult to assess the presence of foreign criminal actors in Algeria because of strong regional bonds and communal and family ties. While historically, foreign actors played more of an intermediary role in domestic criminal markets, there is more evidence of their presence, particularly in the south, involved in illegal gold extraction, arms trafficking, human smuggling and trafficking, and food and oil trafficking. Private-sector actors have been involved in corruption schemes during ex-President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's government, but there is no evidence of private businesses facilitating or collaborating with organized crime groups.



RESILIENCE

LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

Algeria is known for its strong law enforcement and military leadership in the fight against transnational organized crime. The country is considered the main security power in the region, with a reputation as a stabilizing force. The security apparatus links the fight against organized crime with terrorism, resulting in a tough on-the-ground approach against criminal networks. The government has prioritized the fight against corruption, and several political leaders from the previous government have been tried and convicted. Nevertheless, these measures seem are not sufficient and no real reforms on transparency have taken place.

Algeria has signed major international treaties and conventions related to organized crime and has established standards and systems for international cooperation. The country is leading the implementation of Afripol, the AU police cooperation mechanism headquartered in Algiers. However, information-sharing related to high-level tax evasion cases or common judicial trials is limited. Algeria has upped its diplomatic activity since 2020, particularly towards neighbouring countries, aimed at assuring more stability in the region and tackling transnational organized crime. Strong anti-organized crime laws are in place, with severe penalties for crimes such as drugs, human trafficking, arms smuggling, and other offences.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY

Algeria has a robust law enforcement capacity to combat organized crime on the ground, with well-trained and wellequipped personnel. However, the tough-on-crime policy can lead to operational excesses, and cooperation between forces can be problematic. While the country has deployed impressive law enforcement measures along its vast borders, many breaches exist, and it is unlikely that the army can achieve complete control over such a vast territory in a fragile environment. There are micro-zones where the state is weak, and although it can project authority at times, it struggles to assert it continuously. These zones are known to harbour terrorist groups. Territorial integrity remains the highest priority for the security apparatus given that Algeria has the largest territory among African countries, with three large borders with conflict-torn countries (Mali, Libya, and Morocco). Algeria has yet to implement a comprehensive strategy to prevent cyber infiltrations and is vulnerable to spyware attacks.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT

The extent of money laundering through Algeria's formal financial system is minimal due to stringent regulations and a banking sector dominated by state-owned banks. The numerous checks on money transfers make the system highly bureaucratic, which discourages illicit transactions. However, vulnerabilities outside the formal financial system continue to be an issue, particularly in the real estate sector, where transactions are mainly conducted in cash with no requirement to prove their origin. The country's tax authority and financial intelligence processing unit have made little progress in tackling money laundering, and there is a lack of political will to do so.

Algeria's economic crisis continues to worsen, with the prices of essential goods increasing, and the Algerian Dinar losing half of its purchasing power over the last decade. While the government increased the basic minimum wage in 2020, the prices of goods are surpassing income increases, likely leading to the necessity of seeking external debt. And as a result of the budget deficit, the government lifted food subsidies as they became unaffordable. Due to fiscal limitations, the government has yet to implement a plan to tighten its budget, which can further destabilize the national market. Among the measures to raise more revenue, an additional excise tax of 5% for all tobacco products was applied.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

Algeria's capacity to support victims and witnesses is inadequate, and although there have been some advances, drug users still face challenges in accessing effective treatment and support. Efforts to combat human trafficking have improved compared to previous years, including increased investigations and prosecutions. However, victim identification systems remain insufficient and victim protection services are inadequate. The government claims to have provided an unspecified number of victims with medical, legal, and psychological aid, but it has failed to supply tailored shelter or protection services.

Prevention activities in Algeria fall below global standards. Organized crime prevention efforts focus on drug consumption and human trafficking, and a new national anti-trafficking action plan is being drafted. However, many activities related to the previous national anti-trafficking action plan were postponed following COVID-19 restrictions and prolonged political paralysis.

Civil society in Algeria faces numerous challenges. For instance, NGOs deal with considerable bureaucratic obstacles when trying to establish and operate in the country, leaving



them in a legally precarious position. Political restrictions make it difficult for them to conduct field activities or public conferences. Despite the challenges, civil society in Algeria remains dynamic and vocal.

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