





















1.76

CRIMINALITY SCORE

192nd of 193 countries **13**th of 14 Oceanian countries **4**th of 4 Micronesian countries



CRIMINAL MARKETS	1.65
HUMAN TRAFFICKING	1.50
HUMAN SMUGGLING	2.50
ARMS TRAFFICKING	1.00
FLORA CRIMES	1.00
FAUNA CRIMES	3.00
NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	3.50
HEROIN TRADE	1.00
COCAINE TRADE	1.00
CANNABIS TRADE	1.00
SYNTHETIC DRUG TRADE	1.00



CRIMINAL ACTORS	1.88
MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	1.00
CRIMINAL NETWORKS	1.00
STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	3.50
FOREIGN ACTORS	2.00



4.67

RESILIENCE SCORE

99th of 193 countries **11**th of 14 Oceanian countries **3**rd of 4 Micronesian countries
















4.67

RESILIENCE SCORE

99th of 193 countries **11th** of 14 Oceanian countries **3rd** of 4 Micronesian countries

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	5.00
GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	4.50
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	6.00
NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	6.50
JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	6.00
LAW ENFORCEMENT	5.50
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	7.50
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING	6.00
ECONOMIC REGULATORY CAPACITY	4.00
VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	2.00
PREVENTION	1.00
NON-STATE ACTORS	2.00







CRIMINAL MARKETS 1.65



CRIMINAL ACTORS

1.88





CRIMINALITY

CRIMINAL MARKETS

PEOPLE

Overall, organized criminal activity in Nauru is very limited. Although the country is situated close to human trafficking routes from South-eastern and Eastern Asia to other Pacific island countries, there is no evidence to suggest Nauru plays any role in the transnational or domestic human trafficking market. This is also the case for the human smuggling market, although the presence of refugees in the country – a relic of the Australian offshore asylum-seeker processing centres – may be a factor in the smuggling of migrants abroad. This notwithstanding, there is very little evidence of organized criminal involvement and, insofar as they exist, the numbers involved are most likely extremely small.

TRADE

Nauru is one of the few countries in Oceania to have a complete ban on civilian firearm ownership, and no arms trafficking market exists there. Nor is there evidence that criminal actors have sought to create a black market for small and light weapons in the country.

ENVIRONMENT

Although there is no evidence of organized criminal activity in the forestry sector or with regard to the trade in other flora products, Nauru is potentially at risk of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, but even in this regard, there is no information to suggest any organized crime involvement. With regard to non-renewable resources, phosphate has historically been, and continues to be, an important contributor to Nauru's economy. As with other environmental markets in the country, nothing points to organized crime groups being involved in any form of illicit mining activity, although there have been allegations of corruption within the extractives sector.

DRUGS

There is no indication that any drug markets exist in Nauru. Given the island state's size and tiny population, in addition to its remoteness, Nauru is neither a source country for any type of drug, nor is there any consumer demand for narcotics. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest Nauru plays any role as a transit country in the transnational heroin, cocaine, cannabis or synthetic drug trade.

CRIMINAL ACTORS

Given the absence of organized criminal activity in Nauru, organized criminal actors do not operate in the country. Due to Nauru's location, population, demographics and limited trade and transport infrastructure, there are very few opportunities for criminal predation in the country. The government exerts full control over licit markets, in which it often exhibits abuses of power, in particular with regard to the mining of phosphate, where allegations of bribery of government officials have been made.

RESILIENCE

LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

The organized crime landscape in Nauru very rarely features in government communications. Political developments and decision-making in Nauru are often heavily influenced by foreign governments, in particular Australia, due to the establishment of the now closed Australian refugee processing centre that was crucial to the Nauruan economy. The high level of foreign involvement has had mixed results but has certainly had a negative impact on the international reputation of the island state. Nevertheless, the government has made efforts to tackle criminal activity where necessary, in particular with regard to the country's reputation as a tax haven and the consequent money laundering activity

that takes place in Nauru. However, there are almost no effective mechanisms in place to fight corruption in the state apparatus, and government transparency, on the whole, is very limited. There is no access-to-information law in place and the concentration of media outlets in the hands of the state comes as a detriment to government transparency and accountability.

Nauru has ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols on migrant smuggling, trafficking in persons and the illicit arms trade, and has acceded to the UN Convention against Corruption and the 1988 UN Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Nauru is also a member of INTERPOL and



the Pacific Islands Law Officers' Network, Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police and the Pacific Islands Forum. Overall, Nauru has the legislative and institutional measures in place to enable and engage in international cooperation, but practical and actual international cooperation appears to be ad hoc rather than strategic and is heavily influenced by major donor countries. Furthermore, information on actual cases of extradition and mutual legal assistance is very limited, as is Nauru's ability to make and respond to requests for international criminal justice cooperation. With regard to Nauru's domestic legislation, the legal framework pertaining to organized crime is sound and of a higher standard than many countries in the region. The new criminal code, adopted in 2016, contains several provisions on different forms of organized crime, including the possession of firearms and modern slavery, but, given the limited extent of organized criminal activity, evidence of effective implementation of the legislation is scarce.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SECURITY

The judicial system in Nauru is sufficiently capable of addressing the current organized crime threat in the country. Given that it is a limited threat, there are no judicial units tasked with dealing specifically with organized crime. Similarly, prison conditions in the country have generally met international standards and there is no evidence of criminal actors controlling illicit activity within the country's single prison.

Its small size and location make Nauru fairly resilient to transnational organized crime threats. As with the judicial system, there are no law enforcement units that specifically focus on organized crime, largely due to the absence of any organized crime threat. Given the scarcity of organized crime markets and actors in the country, it is likely that most police and other law enforcement officials have little training or experience with organized crime. However, Nauru is part of a network of transnational crime police units in the Pacific, which may also provide an avenue to seek assistance should any serious cases of organized crime arise. Overall, law enforcement in Nauru is heavily reliant on international assistance from other Pacific island states, Australia and New Zealand for major criminal investigations and, as such, these cooperative efforts provide a safety net.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT

The vast majority of the labour force in Nauru is employed in either phosphate mining or the public sector, such as education, transport or public administration, making the government the country's single largest employer. While the economy experienced significant growth in past decades due to the success of the phosphate sector, depletion of the resource, together with a considerable lack of economic diversification in the country, has left Nauru's economy in an extremely fragile state. Although

growth has picked up in recent years, the declining revenue from phosphate mining and activities associated with the Regional Processing Centre for asylum-seekers means that there are few avenues available for future growth. This, in turn, may have a negative impact on unemployment rates and by extension, may potentially serve to stimulate the informal economy.

In the early 1990s, Nauru was a money-laundering haven, but since then the government has made considerable efforts to improve the country's anti money-laundering framework. The country is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and has in place a financial intelligence unit. Over the past two decades, Nauru has taken serious steps to reduce, prevent and suppress money laundering through the country and its financial institutions, thus addressing long-standing concerns. The reliance on illicit cash flows, to some degree, appears to have been substituted by greater reliance on foreign donors, Australia in particular.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION

Because of the small size of the country, it is likely that any victim- and witness-support mechanism would need to be outsourced to other Pacific island countries and Australia. Furthermore, due in part to the absence of organized criminal activity, victim- and witness-support structures in Nauru are not well developed. Prevention strategies pertaining to organized crime are largely absent for the same reasons, as are any civil society organisations working on issues related to organized criminal activity. Nevertheless, there are several advocacy groups for women, as well as development-focused and religious organizations that make up the wider civil-society landscape in Nauru. The media environment, however, is not conducive to exposing organized criminal activity should it arise in the future, as there are very few media outlets, and those that do exist are for the most part state-owned, while the government has made it increasingly difficult for foreign journalists to work in the country.

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