The Organized Crime Index | ENACT
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Turkmenistan
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    Profile

    Turkmenistan

    Capital

    Ashgabat

    Population

    7,494,498

    Gross domestic product (GDP - CURRENT $US MILLION)

    USD 82,515 million

    Area (KM²)

    488,100 km²

    4.35-0.05

    Criminality score

    138th of 193 countries 6

    38th of 46 countries in Asia 2

    6th of 8 countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus 0

    Criminal markets

    4.400.00

    An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.

    Human trafficking

    8.00-0.50

    Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.

    Human smuggling

    5.500.00

    Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.

    Extortion and protection racketeering

    4.00-1.00

    Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.

    Arms trafficking

    2.000.00

    The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.

    Trade in counterfeit goods

    4.500.50

    The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.

    Illicit trade in excisable goods

    5.000.00

    The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.

    Flora crimes

    2.00-0.50

    The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.

    Fauna crimes

    2.500.00

    The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.

    Non-renewable resource crimes

    7.000.00

    The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.

    Heroin trade

    6.500.00

    The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.

    Cocaine trade

    1.500.00

    The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cannabis trade

    4.000.00

    The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.

    Synthetic drug trade

    4.500.50

    The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.

    Cyber-dependent crimes

    2.500.00

    Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.

    Financial crimes

    6.501.00

    Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.

    Criminal actors

    4.30-0.10

    An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.

    Criminal networks

    4.50-0.50

    Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.

    State-embedded actors

    9.000.50

    Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.

    Foreign actors

    3.500.00

    State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.

    Private sector actors

    2.500.00

    Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.

    2.17-0.04

    Resilience score

    180th of 193 countries 0

    41st of 46 countries in Asia 0

    8th of 8 countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus 0

    Government transparency and accountability

    1.500.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    1.500.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    2.500.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    1.500.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    2.000.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    4.500.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    3.00-0.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    2.000.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    2.000.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    2.000.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    1.500.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    2.17 4.30 4.40 2.17 4.30 4.40

    2.17-0.04

    Resilience score

    180th of 193 countries 0

    41st of 46 countries in Asia 0

    8th of 8 countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus 0

    Government transparency and accountability

    1.500.00

    The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.

    International cooperation

    1.500.00

    A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.

    National policies and laws

    2.500.00

    A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.

    Judicial system and detention

    1.500.00

    Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.

    Law enforcement

    2.000.00

    The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.

    Territorial integrity

    4.500.00

    The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.

    Anti-money laundering

    3.00-0.50

    A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.

    Economic regulatory capacity

    2.000.00

    The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.

    Victim and witness support

    2.000.00

    Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.

    Prevention

    2.000.00

    Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.

    Non-state actors

    1.500.00

    The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.

    Analysis

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    People

    Human trafficking is a significant concern in Turkmenistan. Forced labour is particularly prevalent in the cotton industry, where state policies mandate the participation of public-sector workers, soldiers and vulnerable populations to meet production quotas. Reports indicate that even children as young as eight are forced to pick cotton under harsh conditions. Corruption has a critical role in perpetuating this system, with officials profiting from extortion schemes and farmers facing threats of land expropriation if they refuse to comply. Beyond domestic exploitation, Turkmen nationals are trafficked abroad, particularly to Türkiye, Russia, India and Western Asia, where they are subjected to forced labour in agriculture, construction, textiles and domestic service. Women are also exploited in the sex trade abroad. A lack of victim identification and minimal government assistance exacerbate the crisis.

    The restrictive national policies and economic difficulties in Turkmenistan drive many citizens to seek irregular migration routes, making them vulnerable to smuggling networks. Criminal groups operating in Türkiye have a significant role, often collaborating with Turkmen companies to recruit labourers through illicit channels. The government’s refusal to issue or renew passports for citizens abroad exacerbates their vulnerability, leaving many without legal status and exposing them to exploitation. Transnational smuggling networks extend beyond Türkiye and Russia, with routes also leading into the EU. Polish authorities have intercepted Turkmen nationals involved in smuggling operations, revealing pathways through Belarus and Poland into Western Europe. In addition, Turkmen migrants in Türkiye have been targeted by terrorist recruiters exploiting their precarious legal status.

    Although there is limited documented evidence of organized extortion networks, the construction sector experiences cases of racketeering, and some banks have been implicated in schemes that extort money from small businesses and individuals. Cases of extortion have also been documented in other economic sectors, particularly in the cotton harvest industry.

    Trade

    Turkmenistan’s arms trafficking market is relatively small, but involves domestic and foreign actors, particularly those linked to Afghanistan. Although the government has made efforts to confiscate unlicensed firearms, bribery and corruption allow some individuals to regain access to their weapons. Turkmenistan’s proximity to Afghanistan and regional instability contribute to arms smuggling risks, but overall, the state maintains tight control and transnational arms trafficking routes largely bypass the country.

    The counterfeit goods market in Turkmenistan is prevalent, spanning textiles, electronics, footwear and pharmaceuticals. Criminal networks and foreign actors, primarily from Türkiye and China, dominate the trade, with both small retailers and high-ranking state affiliates being involved. Marketplaces in major cities, such as Ashgabat’s Russian and Teke bazaars, serve as distribution hubs for counterfeit products. Criminal groups are also involved in the production and distribution of counterfeit vodka, particularly from local brands.

    The illicit trade of excise goods, particularly alcohol and tobacco, persists despite government crackdowns; foreign actors are involved in supplying materials for these operations. High tobacco prices and restrictions on legal sales fuel an underground cigarette market. Reports suggest that illicit tobacco networks operate with state protection in some areas, complicating enforcement efforts.

    Environment

    Flora crimes in Turkmenistan are relatively minor and primarily involve illegal logging for firewood and overharvesting of wild plants such as rhubarb. Efforts to provide natural gas have reduced reliance on firewood, yet funding and expertise shortages hinder effective forest monitoring.

    Turkmenistan serves as a transit point for wildlife trafficking, particularly the illicit trade of falcons and hawks to the Gulf states. The trade in viper snake venom also persists. Despite this, the overall scale of fauna crimes appears limited. The country remains the only one in Central Asia not party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, but participates in regional environmental initiatives, such as fishing bans aimed at fish stock preservation. Reports indicate declining populations of saiga antelope and kulan, highlighting gaps in conservation enforcement.

    Non-renewable resource crimes are pervasive in Turkmenistan, involving fuel smuggling and fraudulent oil transactions. Corruption and fraud are widespread in the sector, particularly in oil and gas. Smuggling operations involve under-reporting crude oil exports, leading to the sale of surplus volumes on the black market. State-affiliated actors engage in illicit profit schemes involving kickbacks and fuel adulteration. The lack of transparency in the natural gas trade has led to significant financial losses. Reports also suggest that high-ranking officials profit from illicit mineral fertilizer sales.

    Drugs

    Turkmenistan is a key transit country for Afghan heroin en route to Europe. Although official heroin seizures have been low, state-affiliated actors and criminal networks are suspected of facilitating the trade. Limited economic opportunities contribute to local participation in the drug trade, particularly in areas such as Gyokdepe. Smuggling routes through Iran and Türkiye connect to European markets, such as in the Netherlands, with border security officials often complicit in trafficking operations. Evolving smuggling tactics, such as drone usage, have been reported.

    There is little evidence of an established cocaine market in Turkmenistan, suggesting that its presence is small and limited to elite consumers. Conversely, cannabis is the most widely used illicit drug in Turkmenistan, with trafficking networks linked to Afghanistan. Although domestic demand is relatively low, border interceptions suggest that cannabis is trafficked through Turkmenistan to other destinations.

    Synthetic drug use, particularly of tramadol and other pharmaceutical opioids, is increasing, especially among young people. Transnational networks operate through Turkmenistan, with methamphetamine smuggling routes traced from Iran across the country into other parts of Central Asia. This underscores Turkmenistan’s role as a transit point in the regional drug trade. The prison system is particularly affected by synthetic drug addiction, with drugs smuggled into prisons by staff and distributed among inmates and contributing to high mortality rates among inmates. Despite law enforcement efforts targeting small-scale distribution, local drug production continues to occur in urban areas, with precursor chemicals imported from China.

    Cyber Crimes

    Although cyber-dependent crimes such as ransomware attacks are becoming more common, the market in Turkmenistan remains limited. Criminal actors, including foreign entities, exploit vulnerabilities in the country’s underdeveloped cybersecurity infrastructure.

    Financial Crimes

    Turkmenistan’s financial sector is plagued by fraud, embezzlement and tax evasion, often involving bank employees and state actors. Economic hardships and a food crisis have exacerbated difficulties in cashing out salaries and pensions, leading to the rise of unofficial cash-out services and increased bank card fraud. Online scams, in particular fraudulent travel agencies and electronic trading schemes, have proliferated. Corruption within state institutions continues to facilitate financial crimes, undermining enforcement efforts. The informal economy is substantial, with many transactions occurring outside formal financial channels to evade state scrutiny. Offshore accounts are commonly used to hide assets, further complicating efforts to track and regulate financial activities.

    Criminal Actors

    Only a limited number of mafia-style groups are present in Turkmenistan, primarily owing to the state’s aggressive crackdowns in the 1990s. ‘Thieves in law’, a criminal fraternity originating in Stalinist prison camps, used to operate in the country, but they were systematically eradicated under President Saparmurat Niyazov’s regime. Prominent figures such as Ayli and Aymurad were executed, significantly weakening the group’s presence. Although some elements may still persist in the criminal underworld, mafia-style organizations hold little influence over Turkmenistan’s prison system, which remains under the absolute control of the state. Mafia-style groups have moderate access to weapons, but members do not openly carry arms. Criminal networks, however, do exert influence over Turkmenistan’s criminal markets by engaging in human, drug and arms trafficking, often operating with medium levels of violence. They are particularly widespread in border areas, where they are involved mainly in trafficking activities. Unlike structured mafia-style organizations, these networks function opportunistically and flexibly.

    The Turkmenistan government exercises near-total control over all public institutions and economic sectors. In a similar vein, state-embedded actors are deeply entrenched in the country’s criminal activities as well, either organizing or enabling illicit enterprises. The political elite and high-ranking government officials are suspected to be key players in corruption networks, controlling various aspects of illicit financial flows and economic crimes.

    Foreign criminal actors have a presence in Turkmenistan’s illicit markets, with significant influence from Uzbek and Afghan diasporas. These groups maintain economic and financial power in the country’s underground economy, contributing to the smuggling of goods, narcotics and arms. Transnational connections between foreign and local criminal networks facilitate the movement of contraband across borders. Although direct foreign-state involvement in organized crime is unclear, non-state actors from neighbouring countries have a role, particularly in illicit trade and smuggling operations.

    Private-sector actors in Turkmenistan are implicated in financial crimes and operate in an environment where regulatory oversight is weak and corruption is widespread. Specific details regarding the scale and mechanisms of these crimes are limited, but economic pressures and a lack of enforcement contribute to ongoing illicit financial activities. The blurred distinction between state and private enterprises further complicates efforts to combat financial crime, as many private entities are either controlled by or beholden to state-embedded actors.

    Leadership and governance

    Turkmenistan has a highly centralized political system dominated by the president, who succeeded his father in 2022. Governance is characterized by an absence of democratic processes, severe restrictions on political rights, and the systematic suppression of opposition. Elections are tightly controlled, with no genuine competition, and state institutions operate under direct presidential authority. The government exerts complete control over the security sector, reinforcing a culture of impunity among law enforcement and state officials. Enforced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and persecution of political dissidents, and often reported, further entrench the state’s repressive rule. Reports of high-level conspiracies and attempted coups reflect tensions within elite circles. Internet blackouts and strict information control hint at state efforts to suppress details of dissent and maintain power. Despite the regime’s grip, internal fractures within elite networks point to the existence of competing factions within the ruling structure.

    Turkmenistan faces severe transparency and accountability deficits. Corruption is pervasive across all sectors, including public administration, law enforcement and the judiciary. Patronage networks dominate state institutions, allowing officials to engage in bribery and embezzlement with impunity. Public access to information is severely restricted, and independent oversight mechanisms are absent. Although the government occasionally arrests and prosecutes low-level officials for corruption, these actions are largely symbolic and do not address the entrenched systemic issues. The leadership maintains centralized control over numerous sectors, including the judiciary, with little to no legislative oversight, which further erodes transparency and accountability.

    Internationally, Turkmenistan maintains a policy of strict neutrality, limiting its engagement in regional and global efforts to combat organized crime. Despite being a signatory to various international treaties related to trafficking and drug control, enforcement is weak and inconsistent. Cooperation with international organizations is largely superficial, with minimal substantive action taken to implement commitments.

    The legal framework nominally criminalizes various forms of organized crime, including human trafficking, drug trafficking and arms smuggling. However, enforcement is inadequate, and gaps persist in key areas such as protections against human smuggling. Despite the adoption of national action plans addressing trafficking and organized crime, implementation remains ineffective owing to systemic corruption and a lack of political will.

    Criminal justice and security

    Turkmenistan’s judicial system is neither independent nor effective in addressing organized crime. Judges are appointed and dismissed at the president’s discretion, leading to a judiciary that serves the interests of the ruling elite rather than upholding justice. Due process is routinely disregarded, and politically motivated prosecutions are common. Reports indicate that judicial proceedings are opaque, with defendants often denied fair trials and access to legal representation. Turkmenistan’s prison system is notorious for forced disappearances, with the Ovadan Depe prison serving as a primary site where political prisoners, alleged Islamists and individuals accused of conspiring against the state are held without due process. Corruption within prison administration exists, yet the penitentiary system remains firmly under the state control, with no significant influence from criminal actors.

    Law enforcement agencies primarily function as instruments of state control rather than as entities focused on combating organized crime. The police and security services are deeply corrupt, frequently engaging in bribery and abuse of power. Although the state maintains strict control over the population through surveillance and repression, efforts to tackle organized crime are minimal.

    Territorial integrity is challenging owing to Turkmenistan’s long and porous borders with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Iran, as well as its Caspian Sea coastline. The country serves as a transit point for narcotics smuggled from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe. Border security is hindered by corruption, with officials reportedly facilitating smuggling activities in exchange for bribes. Despite efforts to strengthen border control, including cooperation with international organizations, enforcement remains inconsistent and are undermined by systemic corruption.

    Economic and financial environment

    Anti-money laundering measures are weak and poorly enforced. The country has adopted laws and regulations addressing money laundering and terrorist financing, but implementation is inconsistent. Financial institutions lack the capacity and political independence to enforce compliance effectively. Reports suggest that illicit financial flows, including those linked to drug trafficking and state corruption, continue largely unchecked. Although the government has pledged to strengthen regulations to counter money laundering, these efforts remain largely superficial and fail to address the root causes of financial crime.

    Turkmenistan’s economy is heavily state controlled, with significant restrictions on private enterprise. The country’s regulatory environment is opaque, with key economic decisions made by a small circle of elites closely tied to the president. Corruption is pervasive in business dealings, and foreign investment is limited owing to regulatory uncertainty and lack of transparency. The absence of transparency in business dealings enables corporate entities to continue exploiting economic loopholes.

    Civil society and social protection

    Minimal support is available for victims or witnesses of organized crime. The government does not provide adequate services for victims of human trafficking, forced labour or other forms of exploitation. Laws to protect victims do exist, but enforcement is weak, and many victims are treated as criminals rather than receiving assistance. Civil society organizations, where they exist, struggle to provide support owing to government restrictions and a lack of funding.

    Prevention efforts are similarly inadequate. The government has implemented some initiatives aimed at raising awareness of human trafficking and drug abuse, but these programmes are often symbolic rather than substantive. Forced labour is a significant issue, particularly in the cotton industry, where state-imposed labour requirements force citizens, including children, to work in harsh conditions. Efforts to combat human trafficking are further undermined by the government’s denial of the problem and its unwillingness to engage meaningfully with international organizations.

    Civil society in Turkmenistan is highly restricted, with independent NGOs facing severe limitations on their activities. Human rights organizations and media outlets critical of the government are banned, and activists are frequently subjected to harassment, imprisonment or exile. The internet is heavily censored, and access to independent information is limited. International NGOs have limited access to the country and their operations are tightly controlled by state authorities. Government measures to address cyber threats often double as mechanisms to restrict internet access and suppress civil society, with censorship and bans on virtual private networks impeding digital freedoms.

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    The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.

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    This project was funded in part by a grant from the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.

    ENACT is funded by the European Union and implemented by the Institute for Security Studies and INTERPOL, in affiliation with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.