Criminal markets
6.600.00
An assessment of the value, prevalence and non-monetary impacts of a specific crime type.
Human trafficking
7.500.00
Illicit activity involving coercion, deception, abduction or fraud for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim’s consent.
Human smuggling
6.500.00
Activities by an organized crime group involving the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants for a financial or material benefit.
Extortion and protection racketeering
6.000.00
Crimes linked to exerting control over a territory/market including as a mediator and/or requesting a benefit in exchange for protection.
Arms trafficking
4.500.00
The sale, acquisition, movement, and diversion of arms, their parts and ammunition from legal to illegal commerce and/or across borders.
Trade in counterfeit goods
7.500.00
The production, transport, storage and sale of goods that are fraudulently mislabeled or fraudulent imitations of registered brands.
Illicit trade in excisable goods
6.500.00
The illicit transport, handling and sale of excise consumer goods despite a ban or outside a legal market. Excludes oil and counterfeits.
Flora crimes
8.000.00
The illicit trade and possession of species covered by CITES convention, and other species protected under national law.
Fauna crimes
8.000.00
The poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES and other species protected by national law. Includes IUU fishing.
Non-renewable resource crimes
8.000.00
The illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources and the illicit trade of such commodities.
Heroin trade
3.500.00
The production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug is considered in determining the reach of the criminal market.
Cocaine trade
4.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cannabis trade
6.500.00
The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves. Consumption is used to determine the market's reach.
Synthetic drug trade
7.000.00
The production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs. Consumption is considered in determining the reach of the market.
Cyber-dependent crimes
7.500.00
Organized crimes that rely solely on using information communications technology with the aim of obtaining a monetary/material benefit.
Financial crimes
8.000.00
Organized crime that results in a monetary loss via financial fraud, embezzlement, misuse of funds, tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance.
Criminal actors
7.100.00
An assessment of the impact and influence of a specific criminal actor type on society.
Criminal networks
7.500.00
Loose networks of criminal associates engaging in criminal activities who fail to meet the defining characteristics of mafia-style groups.
State-embedded actors
8.000.00
Criminal actors that are embedded in, and act from within, the state’s apparatus.
Foreign actors
6.000.00
State and/or non-state criminal actors operating outside their home country. Includes foreign nationals and diaspora groups.
Private sector actors
8.000.00
Profit-seeking individuals/entities who own/control a part of the legal economy free from the state, that collaborate with criminal actors.
Government transparency and accountability
3.00-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
6.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
5.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.500.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
4.000.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
5.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.500.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.000.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Government transparency and accountability
3.00-0.50
The degree to which states have put oversight mechanisms in place to ensure against state collusion in illicit activities.
International cooperation
6.000.00
A country's supranational structures and processes of interaction, policy making and concrete implementation to respond to organized crime.
National policies and laws
5.000.00
A state's legal action and structures put in place to respond to organized crime.
Judicial system and detention
3.500.00
Refers to a state’s judiciary’s power to effectively and independently enforce judgments on organized crime-related cases.
Law enforcement
4.000.50
The state’s ability to investigate, gather intelligence, protect and enforce adherence to its rules and procedures against organized crime.
Territorial integrity
4.000.00
The degree to which states are able to control their physical and cyber territory and infrastructure against organized criminal activities.
Anti-money laundering
5.000.00
A state’s ability to implement measures to combat money laundering and other related threats to the integrity of its financial system.
Economic regulatory capacity
4.500.00
The ability to control/manage the economy and regulate transactions (national and international) for trade to thrive within the rule of law.
Victim and witness support
4.500.00
Assistance provided to victims of various forms of organized crime, including initiatives such as witness protection programs.
Prevention
4.000.00
Refers to the existence of strategies, measures, resource allocation, programmes and processes that are aimed to inhibit organized crime.
Non-state actors
4.000.50
The degree non-state actors are allowed to engage in OC responses and their roles in supporting State efforts/ as watchdogs to governments.
Human trafficking in Indonesia is a complex and pervasive issue, with the country serving as a source, transit point and destination for trafficking. Individuals from economically marginalized regions are especially vulnerable to various forms of exploitation, including forced labour, sexual exploitation and forced criminality. Victims are trafficked both domestically and abroad, particularly to other parts of South East Asia and Western Asia. A notable trend is the trafficking of Indonesian nationals into scam operations in neighbouring countries, where they are coerced into cyber-enabled fraud such as cryptocurrency scams and online gambling. Labour exploitation under coercion is common in sectors like domestic work, construction, manufacturing and fishing, especially in parts of East and South East Asia. Domestically, migrant workers face abuse in the agriculture, mining and processing industries. Child marriage and deceptive recruitment practices contribute to child labour and forced work through debt bondage. Sexual exploitation is facilitated through coercive methods such as sham marriages and fraudulent job offers, especially in urban centres and mining regions. Tourist hotspots have also witnessed child sex tourism. These trafficking operations persist due to weak oversight and the exploitation of legal and regulatory gaps in recruitment and labour systems.
Human smuggling is a significant part of the country’s criminal economy and involves a range of actors and transnational routes. Indonesia is both a source and transit country – individuals are smuggled primarily to neighbouring and Western Asian nations, while asylum seekers from countries such as Myanmar and parts of Western Asia transit through Indonesia on route to Australia. In recent years, there has been an increase in refugee arrivals, including a substantial proportion of women and children. Smuggling operations are sustained by criminal networks that exploit Indonesia’s porous maritime borders and extensive coastline. While authorities have blocked irregular migration attempts, enforcement efforts are undermined by persistent corruption and weak inter-agency coordination, reducing the overall effectiveness of disruption measures.
Extortion and protection racketeering are widespread. Local gangs and militias dominate street-level commerce and informal economies, with newer groups and other coercive actors continuing to extort small businesses and vendors through protection payments and the coercive control of territory.
Arms trafficking in Indonesia is concentrated in areas affected by internal conflict, particularly Papua, where the spread of homemade and trafficked firearms fuels violent confrontations between separatist groups and state security forces. Weapons are sourced both domestically and from neighbouring countries such as Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines, and enter Indonesia through maritime and land routes. Online platforms, including encrypted messaging apps and e-commerce sites, have become key channels for firearms transactions. Those involved include civilians impersonating military personnel, corrupt officials and intermediaries operating in Jakarta and conflict-affected provinces. While the issue is mostly localized to areas like Papua and parts of Sulawesi and Maluku, its overlap with other illicit markets – such as drug and wildlife trafficking – points to an interconnected criminal ecosystem.
Indonesia plays a dual role as both a producer and transit hub in the counterfeit goods trade, driven by its proximity to China and its large manufacturing base. A wide range of counterfeit products circulates domestically and abroad, including pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, automotive parts and luxury items. The growth of e-commerce and social media has significantly facilitated this trade, with platforms identified as enablers of illicit sales. Locations such as Mangga Dua and Batam are notorious for their counterfeit markets, where enforcement is minimal. Organized criminal groups exploit this low-risk, high-reward environment with impunity, often overlapping with other illicit economies such as money laundering and human trafficking.
The illicit trade in excisable goods, particularly tobacco and alcohol, continues to challenge authorities. Despite Indonesia being one of the world’s largest cigarette producers, the illicit cigarette trade is widespread, especially in East and Central Java. Rising excise taxes have further fuelled demand for cheaper, untaxed products. The illicit alcohol market, though smaller due to religious and cultural constraints, remains active and often involves mislabelled imports. Criminal actors, including corporate figures and political elites, are implicated in these markets, leveraging porous borders and weak institutional oversight to operate with relative freedom.
Indonesia is a global hotspot for flora crimes, particularly illegal logging and the illicit trade in high-value plants such as orchids and agarwood. These crimes are fuelled by high demand for land conversion for palm oil plantations and by the economic interests of powerful private and political actors. The sector is deeply embedded in corrupt networks involving local politicians, forestry companies and intermediaries. Illegal timber harvesting is organized and widespread, with profits often laundered through agribusiness and timber processing operations. Although law enforcement efforts, including high-profile container seizures, highlight the persistence of illegal logging, the expiration of key environmental moratoriums has weakened regulatory oversight. Despite recent court rulings against major corporate offenders, illegal logging remains a critical issue.
Fauna crimes are similarly entrenched, with Indonesia functioning as both a source and consumer in the illegal wildlife trade. Species such as orangutans, parrots and Sumatran tigers are targeted for the pet trade and traditional medicine. Trade networks span from poachers to exporters, with social media platforms playing a major role in facilitating transactions. Wildlife smuggling is concentrated around ports and airports, particularly in East Java, where smuggling networks exploit short transit routes and weak enforcement. Corruption and inadequate legislation further hinder intervention efforts. International organizations have observed an increase in online wildlife trafficking and identified thousands of social media accounts involved in the sale of protected species.
The illegal exploitation of non-renewable resources – particularly through unlicensed mining – represents a major environmental crime market in Indonesia. Millions of individuals are estimated to be involved in illegal coal and mineral mining nationwide. These activities often occur with the complicity or direct involvement of state officials, including the police and political figures. Illegal mining contributes significantly to environmental degradation and is believed to finance political campaigns. While recent reforms have introduced stricter licensing requirements and penalty frameworks, illegal mining persists in key provinces such as East Java and South Sumatra.
Heroin trafficking in Indonesia remains limited in scale compared to other narcotic markets, though the country still serves as both a destination and a transit point. International trafficking networks, primarily from South and South East Asia, typically employ concealment methods such as embedding heroin into carpet yarn fibres. Indonesian ports and airports are main entry points, with both foreign and domestic actors implicated in recent seizures. Corruption within law enforcement, including anti-narcotics agencies, is reported to facilitate heroin distribution.
Cocaine use is relatively low but increasing in tourist hubs like Bali. The drug is smuggled by maritime routes and postal services, often concealed in consumer goods. Distribution increasingly relies on social media platforms. While the cocaine market is small, its high price and appeal among expatriates and middle- to upper-class consumers sustain demand. Foreign syndicates dominate this trade, with Indonesian nationals occasionally involved in local distribution. Despite enforcement efforts, corruption and cocaine’s high profitability allow the market to persist.
Cannabis is a significant drug market, characterized by widespread cultivation and consumption. It remains deeply entrenched, driven by local demand and international trafficking networks. Aceh province is a primary cultivation area, with domestic syndicates dominating local production. Authorities have reported substantial seizures and increasing use of social media for distribution. Smuggling operations involve ports in Sumatra and major airports, where corruption – including officials accepting bribes – and weak oversight enable the trade to continue.
Synthetic drugs, especially methamphetamine and ecstasy, represent a complex and expansive market in Indonesia. The country serves as a major transit hub for methamphetamine from the Mekong region, with established distribution routes to Australia and New Zealand. Domestic consumption is rising, and foreign criminal networks – including from Western Asia, China and Mexico – are active in the market. Local production exists but remains limited in scale.
Cyber-dependent crimes in Indonesia have surged alongside the rapid growth of the digital economy. The country has experienced multiple cyberattacks annually, with ransomware and data breaches posing significant threats. Recent high-profile incidents have exposed the vulnerabilities in national infrastructure. Criminal actors include international hacker groups, individual fraudsters and terrorist networks exploiting online platforms. These cybercrimes are often linked to other illicit activities such as trafficking and financial fraud.
Indonesia’s financial crime landscape involves an array of offences, most prevalent being cyber-enabled scams. In recent years, a significant number of entities have been shut down for illegal lending and fraudulent investment schemes, many of which targeted younger people with promises of high returns. Criminal actors include organized forex broker networks and mafia-style groups involved in property fraud. The growth of digital financial services has increased platforms’ vulnerability to phishing, identity theft and social engineering. As more people use digital channels for financial transactions, criminals exploit these platforms to steal sensitive data and defraud users. These trends highlight the growing overlap between digital innovation and illicit financial activity in Indonesia.
Mafia-style groups in Indonesia are deeply embedded across various sectors of society, exerting considerable influence over the economy, politics and law enforcement. Over the past two decades, these groups have become increasingly mobile and adaptive in their operations. Initially involved in illicit activities, many members have expanded into industries such as forestry, manufacturing and online gambling. Some of these actors are often closely tied to powerful political or military families and continue to exert control through informal security provision and coercive tactics. For example, paramilitary-style groups known as ‘preman’ often act as enforcers, with some linked to political elites.
Indonesia’s criminal networks are expansive, loosely organized and frequently intersect with state actors and private interests. These networks play a central role in various illicit markets, including human trafficking, drug smuggling and illegal resource exploitation. They are active in major cities like Jakarta, Surabaya and Medan, as well as in tourist hubs such as Bali. These networks have been implicated in political manipulation, vote-buying and campaign financing, often operating through opaque alliances with elite actors. Human trafficking and terrorism networks also operate across the archipelago, with notable hotspots in regions including Aceh, West Java and Sulawesi. Their fluid and adaptive nature continues to pose challenges for law enforcement.
State-embedded actors wield significant influence over Indonesia’s organized crime landscape, often facilitating or directly participating in illicit markets. Corruption is widespread across all levels of government, with officials frequently accused of involvement in trafficking, smuggling, extortion and the counterfeit goods trade. Law enforcement officials have at times been linked to narcotics networks and efforts to undermine anti-trafficking operations. Reports have revealed that border control officers and prison staff have supported criminal activities, while internal restructuring within anti-trafficking agencies has exposed deeper levels of collusion.
Foreign actors are major players in Indonesia’s criminal ecosystem, particularly in transnational trafficking operations. Lax immigration oversight has enabled foreign criminal groups to establish operations throughout the country, notably in Bali, Java and Sumatera. Western Asian, Chinese and Russian syndicates are actively involved in methamphetamine production and trafficking, often collaborating with Indonesian networks. The tourism sector further facilitates foreign criminal activity, including child trafficking and drug smuggling, particularly in Bali and Nusa Tenggara. Sabah and Aceh serve as major transit zones for human smuggling. Additionally, foreign cybercriminals target Indonesia through gambling and fraud schemes. These transnational threats underscore the porous nature of Indonesia’s borders and the need for stronger cross-border enforcement cooperation.
Private-sector actors also help perpetuate organized crime, particularly through collusion, regulatory evasion and corruption. Political-business alliances are a recurring issue, with deregulation under the previous administration benefiting entrenched business elites who shape policy and control market access. Moreover, legitimate businesses have been implicated in laundering profits from environmental and financial crimes. According to Indonesia’s financial intelligence agency, sectors such as motor vehicle sales, real estate, banking and foreign exchange trading are particularly vulnerable to money laundering. These dynamics highlight the structural overlap between Indonesia’s economic actors and criminal activity, emphasizing the need for enhanced corporate oversight and regulatory reform.
Indonesia’s political leadership and governance structures present a mixed picture of progress and persistent challenges. While the country has demonstrated relative strength in areas such as government effectiveness and regulatory quality, these developments are undermined by ongoing issues with political stability and corruption control. Despite government efforts to combat organized crime – particularly in the lead-up to the 2024 presidential elections – public trust has eroded due to systemic bribery, money laundering and vote-buying. Internal conflicts, especially in Papua, further undermine governmental legitimacy and contribute to regional instability. These governance issues leave Indonesian institutions vulnerable to exploitation by criminal actors.
Government transparency and accountability remain key weaknesses in Indonesia’s fight against organized crime. Although the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) continues to expose high-profile cases, its operational independence has been curtailed. The KPK’s declining credibility reflects broader challenges in enforcing anti-corruption measures. Initiatives such as e-budgeting, e-catalogue systems and public access to budget data demonstrates attempts to improve transparency, but implementation remains inconsistent. Moreover, right-to-information laws are undermined by legal loopholes that permit excessive classification of government information, limiting oversight. The 2024 election period was marked by widespread abuse of power, weakened public trust and the use of criminal proceeds to finance electoral influence operations.
Indonesia maintains strong international cooperation in the fight against organized crime. The country has ratified multiple international treaties related to corruption, drug trafficking and wildlife protection. It actively participates in regional frameworks under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) focused on tackling transnational organized crime and radicalization. Indonesia also engages in joint operations, ministerial meetings and working groups on issues such as illicit drugs, human trafficking and border security. Extradition treaties with key countries and involvement in information-sharing mechanisms reflect its commitment to international legal cooperation. Indonesia’s recent accession to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) signals an effort to align with global standards. The country also works with bilateral partners and international organizations, including the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and the US, on initiatives ranging from drug demand reduction to cybercrime control. However, recurring incidents of cyberattacks and data breaches undermine trust in information-sharing practices with international partners. Domestically, Indonesia’s legal framework covers all major criminal markets, with laws addressing drug trafficking, environmental crimes and cyber-related offences. Recent reforms have introduced stricter penalties for wildlife crimes and prioritized maritime resource protection. Despite this, enforcement remains uneven, particularly in environmental regulation and intellectual property protection. Corruption and limited resources further hinder implementation. Additionally, the rollout of the new criminal code – which includes provisions on cybercrime and human trafficking – has sparked public protests, with critics arguing that it disproportionately empowers the state while limiting civil liberties.
Indonesia’s judicial system faces institutional inefficiencies and lacks the capacity to effectively combat organized crime. While non-judicial bodies such as the KPK and the National Narcotics Agency are more active in tackling criminal activity, the judiciary suffers from low public trust and a reputation for corruption. Public perception suggests that media attention is necessary to spur legal action. Although the government has established a judicial reform team to review and expedite reforms in areas such as criminal justice and anti-corruption, meaningful impact is yet to be seen.
The judicial system also lacks sufficient training to handle complex cases such as human trafficking, which are often prosecuted under lesser charges. Inconsistent sentencing and a high rate of case dismissals further undermine the judiciary’s deterrent capacity. Detention facilities reflect vulnerabilities in the justice system. Overcrowding has pushed inmate populations to nearly double prison capacity, while poor conditions and systemic corruption among prison officers allow drug trafficking networks to operate from within prison walls. Inmates – particularly those convicted of low-level drug offences – often continue engaging in criminal activity due to the lack of effective rehabilitation programmes.
Despite some progress, law enforcement efforts face structural inefficiencies. The Indonesian National Police, responsible for combating organized crime, lacks specialized units and struggles with internal corruption, as evidenced by scandals involving high-ranking officers. While joint task forces involving multiple ministries have been created to tackle crimes such as illegal finance, trafficking and intellectual property violations, their effectiveness is limited by weak accountability. To combat wildlife trafficking and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, Indonesia launched the Indonesian Maritime Information Centre, which uses daily updates to identify suspected IUU fishing areas. In addressing illegal mining, the National Police’s Criminal Investigation Unit has developed strategies including location monitoring, regulatory guidance and process oversight. INTERPOL’s Jakarta office supports capacity-building initiatives, and regional intelligence-sharing agreements exist. However, public trust in law enforcement remains low due to politicization, a lack of transparency and ineffective cybercrime enforcement.
Indonesia’s territorial integrity faces challenges due to its vast and porous maritime and land borders. Smuggling routes, especially in Aceh and Sabah, are frequently exploited by traffickers. Limited infrastructure and weak surveillance capabilities hamper effective border monitoring. To address this, the government has implemented joint patrols and regional cooperation agreements with neighbouring countries such as Malaysia, Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea. Participation in initiatives like the Container Control Programme and plans to develop border areas demonstrate a long-term commitment, although operational challenges remain. Political and security tensions in regions like Papua further complicate border governance, with the creation of new provinces triggering local opposition and sparking fears of escalating conflict. Since early 2024, Indonesia has seen a sharp increase in cyberattacks, with government institutions being particularly vulnerable. The Ministry of Information and Communications and the National Cyber and Crypto Agency oversee the country’s cybersecurity, but ineffective regulations have resulted in fragmented responsibilities among institutions. This disjointed framework has left Indonesia exposed to cybercrime, raising serious concerns about the effectiveness of its cybersecurity measures.
Indonesia has taken several steps to combat money laundering through legislation, financial oversight and participation in international frameworks such as the FATF. The Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre is the primary institution responsible for overseeing compliance, risk assessment and reporting suspicious transactions. Legal reforms have expanded the range of entities required to report suspicious activities and enabled civil servants to conduct parallel investigations. However, the agency’s effectiveness is hampered by poor coordination with previously cooperative institutions, including the KPK. Indonesia has also identified growing financial risks linked to human trafficking and cybercrime. While efforts to block illicit financial flows exist, there is little attention paid to state-embedded actors and widespread under-reporting from major economic sectors.
Indonesia’s economic regulatory environment is moderately developed, marked by a mix of liberal reforms and persistent institutional challenges. While the Omnibus Law on Job Creation and related regulations aim to streamline business licensing and boost competitiveness, they have also raised concerns about environmental protections and labour rights. The country’s economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic has benefited from strong policies, but corruption, weak tax enforcement and regulatory inconsistencies continue to pose challenges. Authorities have promoted e-commerce and digital platforms, though these have also become channels for the sale of illicit goods. Data security and cybercrime present additional risks, especially in the financial services sector.
Indonesia has taken steps to improve victim and witness protection, primarily through its national protection agency. To address the agency’s geographic and resource limitations, community-based programmes have been introduced, and Indonesia has supported regional declarations on protection within ASEAN frameworks. However, major implementation gaps remain. Victims of human trafficking – especially men and rural populations – are often overlooked due to fragmented identification systems and a lack of unified standard operating procedures. Victims of forced criminal activity, such as drug trafficking, are often prosecuted rather than protected, conflicting with the non-punishment principle. Compensation mechanisms for victims are limited, and reintegration support is insufficient. Although shelters and hotlines exist, services vary widely across regions and are not always well-resourced.
Indonesia employs a range of prevention strategies, including trafficking awareness campaigns, school-based anti-drug initiatives, community reporting mechanisms and restorative justice programmes. Thousands of cases have been resolved outside formal courts. However, these efforts are undermined by inconsistent legal definitions and uneven implementation – particularly concerning drug policy. Harsh penalties, including capital punishment for drug offences, as well as reports of torture and arbitrary detention remain serious concerns. While Indonesia has pursued rehabilitation alternatives and legal reforms, vulnerable groups continue to lack adequate protection. Preventative efforts targeting online crime and financial fraud are emerging but lack the necessary enforcement capacity. While awareness campaigns address some of these issues, prosecution and deterrence mechanisms remain weak.
Civil society and non-state actors play a vital role in Indonesia’s resilience ecosystem, particularly in advocacy, victim protection and public awareness. Organizations are active in areas such as trafficking, drug rehabilitation and cybercrime prevention. Despite their contributions, civil society operates in an increasingly restricted environment. Legal frameworks, surveillance and harassment have curtailed the influence of activists and journalists. The Omnibus Law and related regulatory changes have weakened labour unions and limited public participation in political decision-making. Press freedom is further constrained by self-censorship and targeted attacks on media professionals, especially those reporting on corruption and environmental issues. Additional challenges include restrictions on academic research and the arrests of foreign journalists. Nevertheless, social and digital media continue to play a crucial role in amplifying civil society voices and exposing injustices, despite the risk of censorship and retaliation.
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The criminal markets score is represented by the pyramid base size and the criminal actors score is represented by the pyramid height, on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. The resilience score is represented by the panel height, which can be identified by the side of the panel.
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